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INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUPER
HIGHWAYS, SPURRED BY CONSUMER DEMAND,
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND DEREGULATION
The idea of the information superhighway is that a connected system of
networks will provide any sort of communication services (voice, video or data),
anywhere, to anybody. "Based on the model of the Internet- the vast expanding
network of networks- the I-Way is becoming a high-bandwidth web of
communication systems that will pump huge quantities of text, sound, images
and video into and out the home, businesses, factories, hospital, school, and
government offices." l The development of Information superhighways is
possible because of technological developments, consumer demand and strong
political endeavors.
1. Consumer Demand.
Consumer demand for multimedia services is huge. Raymond. W Smith, the
CEO of Bell Atlantic speaks about the "enormous market demand for
interactive, on-line, personalized, easy-to-use, easy-to-find information,
communication and entertainment." 2 This consumer attraction for multimedia
services is reinforced by favorable demographic perspectives.
Don Tascott, The Digital Economy, Promise and Peril in (he Age ofNetwork Intelligence, Mc Graw
Hill Companies, Inc, 1996.
Industry Analysis, The telecommunication Industry, Association for Investment Management and
Research, November 10, 1993, NY.
:James Shaw explains that "[f] rom a demographic standpoint, it is
unmistakable that telecommunications developments serves multiple needs in
multiple markets at a time when consumers can afford to augment their
consumption." 3 Indeed, spending capacity will rise significantly over the next
15 years, as baby boom generations are entering their peak consumption, and
begin to inherit vast amount of wealth.
Information industries will also profit form a unique phenomenon where the
more information people consume, the more they require it to perform work
and facilitate leisure and the greater the need for advanced telecommunication
infrastructure. Therefore, "[t] he communication industry must now prepare for
accelerated demand for all means of distributing information - voice, video,
and data through both wire-line and wireless transmission."4
Another trend will fuel the information revolution: the growing need for
customized information. Customization means that the organization,
management, and distribution of data, voice, and images is made for each
individual according to his or her needs. The way companies offer this
customization will determine the industry's future winners. 5 All these
phenomenon lead to consumer demand for telecommunication and information
services that is qualitatively and quantitatively infinite.
Economic Forecasts predict that the telecommunication industry will grow
more than one trillion dollars by 2000 and double again by 2010. 6 Many
authors do not find words powerful enough to describe the economic impact of
the information revolution.
3 James Shaw, Telecommunication Deregulation, Arthec House, 1998., P 1 1.
*Idp 14.
s Idp 15.
6
Id p 37.
3Don Tascott, explaining the characteristics of the "Networked Intelligence"
states that:
"[i]n the agricultural age, what mattered was the plow and the
mule. In the industrial age, steel, engine, fuel and roads were
kings. In the Age of Network Intelligence, silicon, microprocessor
and roads of glass fiber as thin as human hair are enabling
human across the hall and across the planet to apply their know
how to every aspect of production and economic life. This is an
age of networking, not only of technology but of humans,
organizations and society. The overall structure of the economy is
changing .... a new industrial sector is emerging from the
convergence among computing (computer, software, services),
Communication (telephony, cable, satellite, wireless), and content
(entertainment, publishing, information providers)." 7
2. Technological Developments.
The development of the Information Super Highways is permitted by a series
of technological evolutions. First, the digital technology that reduces any
content, audio, video or data to digits that it can be transported together over
the same path. It "makes telecommunication signals interchangeable, thus
allowing signals from different sources to travel over various types of
infrastructure." 8
Another technological evolution is data compression, a technique that
reduces information in order to save transmission and storage capacity. One
example is key word encoding where frequently occurring words as "here" or
"the" are replaced by two bytes token, saving one or more byte every time the
word is used. Nicolas Negroponte explains that "[bjecause you compute at both
ends of the line, you can ship fewer bits back and forth." 9
7 Don Tascott, supra note 1, p35.
*Id.
9 Nicolas Negroponte, Being Digital, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1995, p 36.
4In addition, technological development in network technologies have led to
unthinkable bandwidth levels where "[A] fiber the size of a human hair can
deliver every issues ever made of the WSJ in less than one second." 10 .
Finally, and surely the most incredible technological development is the
packet switching technology, a revolutionary way to provide any kind of
telecommunication services. The content of the communication is broken into
digital packets that travel autonomously toward their destination, where they
are reassembled. This technology is described by Nicolas Negroponte in "Being
Digital" using a ski-lift analogy;
" The lift is moving at constant speed, while more or fewer people
get on and off. Similarly, you put a number of bits in a packet
and then drop that packet in a pipe capable of delivering it at the
speed of millions of bits per second. ... Instead of tying up an
entire telephone line, as you now do for voice, packets are put
into a queue with names and addresses attached to them, so they
know when and where to get off the ski lift." n
These technologies provide the basis of spectacular developments in
telecommunications. According to Nicolas Negroponte, "commingled bits and
bits-about-bits, change the media landscape so thoroughly that concepts like
video-on-demand and shipping electronic games down your local cable are just
trivial applications- the tip of a much more profound iceberg." 12
The Information revolution has a huge impact on the evolution of
telecommunication networks. A web of interconnected multipurpose network
based on packet switching technology, digitization and data compression is
rapidly replacing the traditional public switched network.
10
Id p 23. Bandwidth is the transmission capacity of a network.
"Id p36.
12
Id.
5Consequently, every modern telecommunication carrier is engaged in the
construction of Internet Protocol (IP) based multi-service platform for data
oriented networks. This lead to bandwidth abundance allowing the provision of
broadband services of which voice represents only a small portion and is
almost free to deliver. In this environment, the future of the public switched
telephone network is uncertain. This is even more so since Internet telephony
now allows voice communication over IP-based networks,
3. Political Endeavor and Deregulation.
The construction of Information super highways is backed by strong
political endeavor. It is often referred to as something necessary for the
continuing growth of the American Economy, as was the construction of the
interstate highway system in the 1950's. Vice President Al Gore devotes most
of his time to the development of the Information super highways. Some
authors are convinced enough to declare that "without a state-of-the-art
electronic infrastructure throughout society's organization, no country can
succeed." 13
Until recently, the telecommunication industry was considered to be a
"natural monopoly," the situation where "a single firm can supply the market at
lower cost than two or more firms." 14 This trend toward a single firm was
reinforced by economies of scale in the telecommunication industries,
according to which "the marginal cost of production are less than the average
cost of production over the relevant range of output." 15
13 See Don Tascott, supra note 1, pi 5.
14 See J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Contract and The Regulatory Contract,
Cambridge University Press, 1997.,
15 See Denis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 295- 96 (Harper Collins,
2ded. 1994), p 138.
6These theories were the central argument for the establishment of a legal
monopoly. Regulation was introduced in the form of barriers to entry and price
control. Barriers to entry allowed the monopolist to recoup its sunk-costs, the
non-recoverable investments needed for the establishment of
telecommunication networks 16 . Price controls were necessary since under this
regulatory model, there was a single player that could easily abuse its position.
Recently, this understanding of the telecommunication industries has
changed. Technological development ended the situation of natural monopoly
and reduced the need to sink costs. Moreover, the convergence of the
computer, broadcasting, and telephony industries weakened the basis for
regulatory separation of the telecommunication industry, as organized in the
Communication Act of 1934. From this resulted a consensus for deregulation.
Both political parties were in favor of telecommunication deregulation and
pushed the Congress to change the Telecommunication Law.
After three years of debate, testimony, and investigation, Congress enacted
the Telecommunication Act of 1996 on February 1, 1996. The Act was signed
into law and became effective on February 8, 1996. Through this legislative
action, Congress wanted to provide a pro-competitive, de-regulatory framework
for advance telecommunications and information technologies that would
benefit all Americans.
The purpose of this thesis is to show how the heavy and unequal regulation
of the different networks and services that will unfold with the Information
revolution. Although the new legislation freed telecommunication companies
from the previous structural barriers, the industry has remained highly
segmented.
16 Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber, supra note 14.
7This lack of regulatory uniformity, due to historic, technological and
economics differences in each segment of the telecommunication industry will
be a burden for the development of the Information Superhighways. Existing
rules have been designed for traditional circuit-switched voice networks, not for
the emerging packet-switched data networks. The current division in the
Commission rules between telecommunication and information services does
not accurately capture the types of companies that provide information sendees
today, and the manner in which they provide these services. Internet
applications have a hybrid character between information and
telecommunication services.
New services such as Internet telephony, real-time streaming audio and
video services over the Internet, do not fit into the regulatory scheme of the
Telecommunication Act of 1996. Internet telephony allows what appears to be
a basic service, voice transmission; to take place over a packet-switched
interactive data network traditionally considered to provide enhanced service.
And this current controversy is just the tip of an iceberg of difficulty, since all
major telecommunication player plans to develop tomorrow's
telecommunication on the model of the Internet, and offer Internet type
services.
Another difficulty with the new legislation is that many operators in the
telecommunication industry are regulated differently. Telecommunication
carriers, subject of our first chapter, will be subject to different regulatory
regimes, depending on whether they provide "normal", local exchange or
wireless telecommunications services. First, local exchange (LX) telephone
carriers are subject to different provisions depending on whether or not they
are incumbents (Regional Bell Operating Companies), or not (Local Exchange
Carriers).
9Another aspect of chapter will examine the regime that applies to
telecommunication carriers providing information services. We wall see that
here is another source of complication in the already disunited
telecommunication regulation.
Chapter three focuses on the different regulatory regime applying to video
programming delivery. Because of the Telecommunication Act's attempt to
introduce competition in the video-programming market, we have different
regulation for the incumbent cable operator, i.e. the cable operators, and the
new entrants. The Act imposed reduced regulatory burden on new entrant,
while perpetuated a heavy regulation on cable operators, to limit their anti-
competitive conduct during the period necessary for the establishment of
challengers.
We will also discuss, in this chapter, about the difficulty to classify Internet
and other interactive service provided by cables into existing regulatory
category. The definition of cable stayed almost unmodified since the beginning
of cable regulation. However, cable services are evolving at a rapid pace, and
new interactive services such as the Internet can be provided over the cable
facilities. Again, these new services do not fit the classifications and stand
somewhere between the categories of cable service and information service.
The fourth chapter deals with spectrum management and its
inappropriateness for modern wireless telecommunication. Cohabitation of
multiple wireless telecommunication players has become possible thanks to
technological developments in spectrum use. Decided to increase competition
in the wireless industry, Congress freed important part of the spectrum and
allowed the FCC to distribute it to a combination of incumbent and news
entrant in the telecommunication industry.
8Through this irregular regulation, the Telecommunication Act dealt with the
problem of repositioning the former monopolists in the newly competitive local
exchange market. The previous monopoly position of Regional Bell Operating
Companies ("RBOCs") gave them competitive advantages that they could have
used to enter the competitive market and recreate a vertical integration of the
telephone industry. The Act therefore forces RBOCs to share their assets with
new competitors in the local exchange market, and condition their ability to
enter the long distance market to their showing that there is competition in the
LX markets. Non-incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("LECs") have to comply
with a set of rules designed to maintain competition in the local exchange
market.
Commercial Radio Mobile Services ("CMRS") operators benefit from a
favorable regulation that is designed to introduce competition in the wireless
industry. Finally, all telecommunication carriers have to comply with a general
regulation that broadly consists of interconnection rights and obligation,
contribution to the system of universal service, and access charge obligations.
The regime applicable to "Information services" and their providers, which
we will see in chapter two, is a result of Congress' intent to facilitate the
development of interactive, multimedia services in an unregulated
environment. Indeed information providers are much less regulated than the
telecommunication carriers. They do not have to contribute to the universal
service fund, nor do they have to pay access charges. Internet is an example of
information service under the new legislation. However, Internet is not only an
information service. It is mainly a network service based on the packet
switching technology. This revolutionary media develops at incredible speed,
and unfold new services every day. Some of them, like Internet telephony
resembles closely to traditional telephony. However, since it is considered
information service, it is not subject to telecommunication regulation.
10
The omnibus legislation of 1993 authorized the FCC auction numerous
radio frequency bands. Auction winners were to receive exclusive licenses for
bands of frequencies able to carry numerous telecommunication services such
as interactive TV, personal communication services ("PCS"), specialized mobile
radio ("SMR") services and paging.
However this regulation of the spectrum correspond to a time when wireless
networks had to open dedicated paths for the prevailing telecommunication of
that time, voice communication. Today's networks, including wireless one, are
all interconnected and function with the packet switching technology. This
technology allows any communication, even voice, to be transported without
the need for a dedicated path. Therefore, the regulation that consists in selling
bands of the spectrum for exclusive use of its owners is inappropriate. With
technological developments, a new spectrum regulation model appears to be
possible, allowing any operator to use the spectrum as long as he or she
complies with a set of rules designed to avoid interference with other operators.
CHAPTER ONE: REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATION
CARRIERS.
An overview of the telephone history is helpful to understand the actual
telecommunication landscape. Telephone developed as a competitive industry
and many operators installed competing wires to reach users' homes. As the
streets were filed with wires, regulators became convinced that a single firm
would better serve the telephone industry. AT&T became the natural/legal
monopolist, and dominated the industry during most of the century.
Technological developments, especially in wireless communication, led to the
actual reversion to competition in the telecommunication industry. However,
several decades of monopoly have shaped the industry in a way that is
incompatible with competition.
INTRODUCTION: HISTORY OF TELEPHONE REGULATION.
1) Development of the Monopoly.
In 1876, Western Union Telegraph System, owner of the telegraph system,
rejected an offer to buy Alexander Graham Bell's patent for the telephone on the
ground that the product had no potential. 1 However, telephone had a great
potential and Graham formed Bell Telephone to exploit the technology. Shortly
after the expiration of Bell's principal patent in 1894, half of the American cities
had several competitive providers for telephone services. And as Gulielmo
Marconi invented the wireless telegraph, the Bell system was facing vigorous
competition.
1
See Michael K. Kellogg et al, Federal Telecommunication Law, 1 1 (1992), at 6.
12
However, the Bell system managed to secure rights in two necessary
technologies for the provision of interexchange (IX) services -the long-distance
loading and the vacuum tube electronic amplifier. 18 This helped the company
to keep a quasi monopoly over the telephone industry.
In 1907, the chairman of AT&T, 19 Theodore Vail, started a nationwide
integration of the company through systematic acquisition of new telephone
companies and unaffiliated local exchange carriers (LECs). Federal and State
courts helped him by permitting interexchange carriers (IXCs) to refuse
interconnection with nonaffiliated local exchange carriers. Before the creation
of the FCC by the Communication Act of 1934 20 , the Interstate Commerce
Commission had jurisdiction over common carriers for interstate services.
However it did not play any role and the State Public Utility Commissions were
the bodies that effectively regulated telephone carriers.
The first intervention at the Federal level was the investigation of AT&T's
anti-competitive conduct by the Department of Justice. Consequently, AT&T
agreed, in the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913, to interconnect its long
distance network with unaffiliated companies. It also agreed to refrain from
further acquiring competing telephone companies and to turn its
manufacturing branch Western Electric into a separate subsidiary. But in
1930 AT&T still had 80% of the American telephone lines and the only long
distance network and Western Electric was the only provider of telephone
equipment. The remaining telephone lines were owned by a large number of
very small companies.
18 See Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunication Reform, Columbia Law
Review, May, 1997
19 At that time, AT&T was a subsidiary of Bell, in charge of the inter-exchange telephony.
20 Communication Act of 1984, Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (Codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. Section 151-
613(1994)).
At this time, Theodore Vail introduced the concept of universal service, an
informal system of subsidies that were collected from interstate exchanges to
reduce the prices of local exchange. He convinced regulators that universal
service could only be provided if one company was providing telephone
services. An implicit agreement developed between the state authorities and
Bell whereby the Local Bell affiliates would provide universal service in
exchange for exclusive local exchange ("LX") franchises. State Commission's
ability to regulate local rates, and subsidize universal service was confirmed in
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 21 where the Supreme Court required that
interstate and intrastate property, revenues and expenses be separated.
The Communication Act of 1934 embodied Vail's views on Universal service
and gave to the state the ability to regulate charges. 22
2) Favorable Regulation.
The 1934 Act created the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC" or
"the Commission") with broad powers for the regulation of interstate
telephony23 . Consequently, regulation of telephony was shared between the
State Commission favoring AT&T's sole position, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") that was pursuing the company's anti-competitive conducts, and in the
middle, the new Federal Communication Commission. The Commission was
not very active in the beginning of its existence, and the Public Utility
Commissions ("PUC") were able to maintain the cross-subsidy system. Only the
DOJ was fighting against the monopoly.
21 282 U.S. 133, 143, 148(1930).
22 Communication Act of 1984, Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (Codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. Section 151-
613(1994)).
3
This repartition of powers led to the accounting separation process of state and federal assets and the
creation of a Federal/State Board for the matters at the border of the two jurisdictions.
14
In 1949, the antitrust division of the Department of Justice filed another
suit against AT&T. The case was settled in the Consent Decree of 1956 where
AT&T agreed to limit its activities to Common Carrier sendees and to refrain
from subsidizing Western Union. 24 Later, in 1970, the FCC and the PUCs met
in a joint board to develop the Ozcar Plan. At this time, the FCC had become
clearly in favor of AT&T's internal cross-subsidy system. The plan maintained
the system of subsidies from interexchange ("IX") to LX services. It artificially
multiplied by three the time that common equipment for both interstate and
intrastate exchange was actually allocated for long distance. In this way, the
state Public Utility Commission could transfer wealth to their favorite
customers, those using local exchange access.
3) Progressive Disintegration of AT&T's Monopoly.
First, the FCC rejected Bell's theory that its network would be harmed by
the attachment of non Bell devices, and introduced competition in the market
of terminal equipment. In Caterfone, the FCC approved a device that
connected telephone subscribers with such wireless services as ship-to-shore
radio. 25 This ruling confirmed Hush-a-Phone, a decision where the FCC
invalidated the "foreign attachment" provision in AT&T's Federal tariffs. 26
Earlier, in 1959, the FCC issued the "Above 890 MHz decision" 27 allowing
large private firms to build and operate microwave transmission facilities (radio
frequency) for their own use.
24
This alternative was preferred to a divestiture.
25 See Use ofthe Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Services, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
26 See Use ofRecording Devices in Connection with Telephone Services, F.C.C. 1033, 1036.
27 See Allocation ofFrequencies in the Bands Above 980 MHz, 27 F.C.C. 359, 414 (1959).
15
The Commission found that the license of private point-to-point microwave
transmission systems would have no adverse economic effects on the integrity
of the Bell system. 28
In the 1960's and 70s, the companies that had been granted the licenses
started to claim the right to interconnect their networks to the local network of
AT&T, in order to sell third parties their surplus of communication capacity. At
the same time, the Commission allowed Microwave Communication, Inc (MCI),
to provide private microwave service in St. Louis, Chicago and nine
intermediate locations. 29
Consequently, thousands of applicants proposed to build microwave
stations. The FCC issued the Specialized Common Carriers decision, allowing
non-Bell companies to offer private line communication services to large
corporate customers. 30 However, the range of services these Specialized
Common Carriers could provide was unclear. The question came up when MCI
wanted to offer Execunet, a switched public message telephone service. The
D.C. Circuit solved the situation, ordering the FCC to accept MCI Execunet
tariffs (Execunet I), 31 and by requiring Bell local exchange carriers to
interconnect switched long-distance services offered by non-affiliated
companies (Execunet II). 32
This series of decision broke the traditional belief that a monopoly carrier
subject to regulatory supervision was the only model for American telephone
industry and paved the way for a complete remodeling of the
telecommunication industry.
28 Wat 411.
29 See In Re Application ofMicrowave Communication, Inc., 18 F.C.C. 2d 953 (1969).
30 See In Re Specialized Common Carrier Services., 29 F.C.C.2d. 870 (1971).
31 See MCI Telecomm. Corp. V. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
32 See MCI Telecomm. Corp. V. FCC, 580 F.2d 590, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
lb
According to one commentator, "[w] hen technological changes exposed the
plausibility of competition in the [consumer premise equipment] and
[interexchange] markets, the commission's relative inexperience allowed it to
consider alternatives that had been ideologically unthinkable during the public
utility era."33
In March 1974, the DOJ renewed its antitrust suit against AT&T, alleging
that it obstructed competition in the IX, consumer premise equipment ("CPE")
and data processing markets by refusing access to its "bottleneck essential
facility." The District Court found that the local switches constituted an
essential facility to which AT&T unreasonably denied access. 34 On the other
hand, the Court held that the inter-city network was not an essential facility
and therefore AT&T was not required to provide network capacity to MCI.
In the first half of the 80' s, different potential entrants in the IX market filed
seventy antitrust against AT&T35 . The Department of Justice and the courts
had the impression that issues that had been decided in Carterfone and the
Specialized Common Carrier Services decision were endlessly re-challenged by
AT&T.
When MCI started to offer long distance telephone services between
businesses for prices much lower prices than AT&T, the Department of Justice
realized that AT&T was artificially maintaining high prices for the long distance
telephony. This led the Department of Justice to order the divestiture of AT&T
in the Modified Final Judgment. 36
33 See Jim Chen, Supra note 2 at 848.
34 See United States v. AT&T Co., 427 F.Supp. 57 D.D.C. 1976).
For example, MCI, who wanted to compete in the provision of long distance telephony for businesses
filed an antitrust suit against AT&T for monopolizing the intercity communication.
36 United States v. AT&T Co., 522 F.Supp. 131, 140-43 (D.D.C. 1982), "the Modified Final Judgment."
17
4) The Modified Final Judgment ("MJF").
The MFJ was a consent decree where AT&T settled with the DOJ by
agreeing to divest from its local exchange assets.
The bargain had a threefold rational. First, local exchange telephony was
still considered a "natural monopoly"37 and would be regulated as such.
Second, long distance telephony was thought to evolve better in a competitive
environment as new entrants like MCI would compete with AT&T and drive the
prices down for the benefit of the consumers. Finally, the divestiture was
thought to be the best alternative to separating the industry into two separately
regulated branches. If AT&T continued to have a monopoly over the local
exchange services, it could leverage38 its position to extend the monopoly to the
long-distance market. AT&T could also refuse interconnection to achieve this
goal.
Consequently, the MFJ completely restructured the industry. It required
AT&T to divest its local exchange operation interest to seven holdings -the
Regional Bell Operating Companies ("the RBOCs"). 39 The RBOCs were given a
monopoly in their respective Local Access Transport Areas (LATAs) for the
provision of local exchange telephony. AT&T, free from the structural barriers
created in 1956, was allowed to operate in the competitive long distance
telephony (interLATA telephony) and in the data processing industry.
37 An industry is said to be a natural monopoly when its is advantageous to the customers and the society to
have a single that operates. For additional explanation on "natural monopoly," see introduction, supra P 4.
38 Leverage is defined as the use of monopoly power in one market to extract additional monopoly rents
and to secure competitive advantages in a second market. J. Gregory Sidak and al., supra note 14, p 48.
19 The seven Bell Operating Companies created by the Modified Final Judgment were: Bell Atlantic, Bell
South, SBC Communication (southwestern Bell), Pacific Telesis Group (PacTel), NYNEX, U.S. West and
Ameritech.
The Bell laboratories were split in two parts, one staying with AT&T, the
other serving collectively the seven RBOCs. Finally, Western Electric remained
a subsidiary of AT&T. The Modified Final Judgment also created structural
barriers for RBOCs to prevent them from leveraging their legal monopoly in the
provision of intraLATA telephony to enter and dominate other markets. RBOCs
were prohibited from (1) providing long distance services, (2) manufacturing
telecommunication and customer premises equipment, (3) providing
information services, and (4) providing non-telecommunication products or
services. The RBOCs were allowed to enter any other unregulated market as
long as they were facing competition. Approximately at the same time, the
Cable Act of 1984 prohibited the RBOCs from providing video programming. 40
The structural barriers created by the Modified Final Judgment were not
designed to be definitive. The consent decree mandated a triennial review to
consider whether the structural barriers were still necessary. Two years before
the enactment of the Act, many states were permitting competition in the local
market and companies such as AT&T, TCG and MSF began competing with the
RBOCs in the local exchange telephony.
5) Deregulation of the Telephone Industry.
The Telecommunication Act of 1996 introduced fundamental changes in the
regulation of telephony. 41 First, following the political trend in favor of the
development of the information super-highways, it subjects all
telecommunication carriers, including telephone carriers, to a general
obligation of interconnection and interconnectivity.
40 Communication Act of 1 984, Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1 064 (Codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. Section 151-
613(1994)).
41 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified in various section of
47 U.S.C. ).
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Second, the Act removed the structural barriers created by the Modified
Final Judgment introducing competition in the local exchange market, and
allowing RBOCs to provide long-distance telephony. However, the Act had to
deal with the previous structure of the industry where RBOCs had become
large companies with control over the bottleneck LX access.
The new legislation introduced a distinct regulatory treatment for
telecommunication carriers and information service providers.
Telecommunication carriers are subjected to a specific regulation designed to
facilitate the creation of a web of interconnected network, and to provide every
American with the benefit of the information revolution (Part I). LECs, RBOCs,
and CMRS have a specific regulatory treatment reflecting their position in the
new competitive environment (Part II)
2d
PART ONE: GENERAL REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATION
CARRIERS.
Telecommunication carriers are subject to a general regulation concerning
interconnection rights and obligations, and contribution to the system of
universal service (Section II). Before describing that regulation, it is necessary
to determine who is considered telecommunication carrier (Section I).
SECTION ONE: TELECOMMUNICATION CARRIER
CLASSIFICATION.
The 1996 Act defines a telecommunications carrier as "any provider of
telecommunications services, ... " 42 Telecommunications services are defined as
the "offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such
classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of
the facilities used." 43 Telecommunication is defined as "the transmission,
between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's
choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received." 44
In the First report and order, the Commission refined the category of
telecommunications carrier. It includes anyone who provides domestic or
international telecommunications for a fee, directly to the public or to such
classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, but only to
the extent that they do so. 45
4: /JSection(3)(a)(49).
43 Id Section (3)(a)(51).
44
Id Section (3)(a)(48).
45
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 and
interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Services Providers,
First Report and Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96- 98, 95- 185, 1 1 FCC Red, 15,499 (1996), (Hereinafter the
First Report and Order).
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The commission also determined that all telecommunications carriers will
be treated alike regardless of the technology used, unless there is a compelling
reason to do otherwise. 46
This classification presented the issue of whether enhanced and information
service providers will be classified as telecommunication carriers and subject to
section 251. The First Report and Order provides that companies providing
both telecommunications and information will be classified as
telecommunications carriers for Section 251 purpose to the extent that such
companies are acting as telecommunications carriers. Information and
enhanced service providers that do not act as telecommunications carriers will
not be subject to the interconnection rights and obligations of section 251(a).
The same rule will apply for cable operators. Finally, the Commission
determined that telecommunication carriers only have to provide
interconnection to information service providers or cable operators to the
extent that they provide telecommunication services. 47
SECTION TWO: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATION OF
TELECOMMUNICATION CARRIERS.
The Act establishes a common regulation for all telecommunication carriers,
focusing on two different points. First it provides all telecommunication
carriers with interconnection rights and obligations, in order to facilitate the
creation of a "network of networks (I). Second, the Act reformed the system of
universal service to fit the competitive telephone industry, extending the
contribution to all telecommunication carriers (II & III).
46
Id
47
Id.
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I- INTERCONNECTION RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER
SECTION 251.
Interconnectivity is a precondition for the development of the information
super highways since they can only function if all the different networks are
interconnected and if their mutual communications are synchronized. The
task is huge if we consider the number of non-standardized networks and
products that are currently used to carry telecommunication services. As on
author explains:
"[cjomplete interoperability would allow a social worker in the
Appalachia to prepare a message on a lab top computer and
transmit it via wireless technology to a receiver. From there the
message might be carried over wires to a satellite earth station,
beamed up to a satellite and beamed back to earth in San
Francisco. The message might then be send over wires to a
broadcast Television station and then, ultimately, to the
addresses interactive Television. The addressee might respond to
the message via the reverse route."
The Telecommunication Act of 1996 attempts to provide such
interconnectivity through interconnection obligations imposed on every
telecommunication carriers. Section 251(a)provides that each
telecommunication carrier has a general duty:
(1) to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and
equipment of other telecommunications carriers; and
(2) not to install network features, functions or capabilities that
do not comply with the guidelines and standards established in
the Act. 48
Section 256(a) of the Act provides that public telecommunication networks
should be accessible by the broadest number of users and vendors of
communication products and services on a nondiscriminatory basis.
A/ Section 251 (a).
23
The Act provides that network and product interconnectivity will be ensured
through standard setting proceedings, called "coordinated telecommunication
network planning and design."49 The Act requires the Commission to oversee
and participate in the coordinated network planning. 50
II- UNIVERSAL SERVICE.
A) INTRODUCTION.
Prior to the 1996 Act, universal service was a system of subsidies to the
local telephone companies funded by charges imposed on IXCs (access charges)
and on the customers. At the beginning of the century, the Bell system had a
monopoly over long distance service and telephone equipment and controlled
half of the market share in local exchange telephony.
Theodore Vail, then president of the Company, convinced the regulators
that Bell should be the only company to operate in the telephone industry. His
argumentation was based on the theory of "natural monopoly," and the notion
of universal service. Vail believed that everyone should have access to a
telephone. He convinced regulators that this goal could only be achieved
through a system of cross-subsidy within his company where local rates would
be artificially low and long-distance rates artificially high. The concept of
universal service was later embodied in the Communication Act of 1934. The
Act directed the FCC to "make available, so far as possible, to all people of the
United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges. "51
49 /^/Section 256 (a)(1), (A) & (B).
50 /«iSection256(b)(l)&(2).
51 Communication Act of 1934, ch. Section 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
Section 151 (1988). Or, 47 U.S.C.s 151 (1934) (Current version at 47 U.S.C.s 151 (1994).
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When the Act was enacted, Bell was cross subsidizing several areas of
services to fund Universal service. Businesses were charged at a higher rate
than were residential customers for the same service. Rural and urban
customers were charged at the same rate although the cost of providing those
services was substantially different. Long distance rates were priced over cost
while local calls were under priced. Finally, rates were determined according to
the distance without considering the higher cost of heavily used routes.
Later, the integrity of universal system became the argument of Bell system
trying to resist introduction of competition in the telephone market. Bell
argued that new entrants would focus on those services that were more
profitable, leaving Bell with the unprofitable business. In the Modified Final
Judgment, the Department of Justice allowed the Regional Bell Operating
Companies to levy access charges on long distance carriers. These access
charges were designed to allow RBOCs to recover the cost of the local service
provided to inter-exchange carriers, and to fund the system of Universal
Service.
In 1984, the FCC decided to reduce charges imposed on IXCs, and imposed
a monthly flat rate charge on subscribers. However, this system of implicit and
explicit charges had several drawbacks. First, it confused the perception of
competition in the IX market. In addition, the program of universal service was
not serving those who needed it. Finally, IXCs had an incentive to bypass the
LECs with technologies such as cellular, dedicated microwave circuits, fiber
optic networks and low orbiting satellites, in order to avoid the access charges.
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B) UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN THE ACT OF 1996.
In the Act of 1996, Universal Service is designed to ensure that promotion of
competition in the telecommunication industries will not exclude poor and
remote American from the information revolution. According to the Act,
"Universal service is an evolving level of telecommunications services that the
Commission shall establish periodically ... taking into account advances in
telecommunications and information technologies and services."52 The
definition of Universal will be revised periodically to include services essential
to education, health or safety, deployed and subscribed to by a substantial
majority of residential customers. 53 The Telecommunication Act of 1996
reformed the system of universal service by changing its funding base. All
telecommunication carriers must now contribute on a nondiscriminatory basis,
to the universal service fund. 54
l)The Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service.
The Act provides for the creation of the Federal-state joint board whose role
is to advise the FCC for the implementation of the access charges and universal
service reforms. 55 The Board's duty is directed to recommend universal service
support mechanisms that are specific, predictable, and sufficient to advance
the principle enunciated by the Act. 56 It is to be composed of three federal
commissioners, four State Commissioners and of a designated consumer
representative. The board made its first recommendation on November 7
1997. 57
52 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 254 (c)(1) (1996).
53 Id Section 254(c)(1) (A)-(B).
54 /^Section 254 (b)(4), (5).
55 /^Section 254(a)(1)).
56
Id.
57 Recommendation of the Joint board, CC DOCKET 96-45, November 7, 1997.
>2) Principle of Universal Service
The Act requires the Joint Board and the Commission to base their actions
concerning universal services on the following principles:
- Quality services should be available at just, reasonable, and
affordable rates.
- Access to advanced telecommunications and information
services should be provided in all regions of the nation.
- Consumers in all regions of the nation, including low-income
consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas,
should have access to telecommunications and information
services, including IX services and advanced telecommunications
and information sen-ices, that are reasonably comparable to those
services provided in urban areas and that are available at rates
that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar
services in urban areas.
- All providers of telecommunications services should make an
equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation
and advancement of universal service.
- There should be specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and
State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.
- Elementary and secondary schools and classrooms, health care
providers, and libraries should have access to advanced
telecommunications services.
- Such other principles as the Joint Board and the Commission
determine are necessary and appropriate for the protection of the
public interest, convenience, and necessity and are consistent
with this Act. 58
The joint board recommended that the principle of competitive neutrality be
added to the list. 59 It means that all providers of interstate telecommunication
services will have to make equitable and non-discriminatory contributions to
the preservation and advancement of universal service.
58 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 254 (b)(1996).
59 Recommendation of the Joint board, CC DOCKET 96-45. November 7. 1997.
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3) Services Included in the Federal Mechanism of Universal Service
Support.
The Joint Board to make recommendation to the Commission for the
definition of the services that are The Board and the Commission have to
identify those telecommunications services that will be supported by Federal
universal service support mechanisms. The Act defines universal services that:
-are essential to education, public health, or public safety,
-have, through the operation of market choices by customers, been subscribed to
by a substantial majority of residential customers,
-are being deployed in public telecommunications networks by
telecommunications carriers; and
-are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity."60
The Joint Board, in its first recommendation of November 7, 1997
recommended that the following services be supported by the federal support
system:
1- Voice grade access to the public switched network,
2- Dual tone multi frequency signaling or its equivalent,
3- Single party service,
4- Access to emergency services, including access to 911.,
5- Access to operator services.,
6- Access to inter-exchange services.,
7- Access to directory assistance. 61
4) Eligible Carriers for Support.
The Act provides that telecommunication carriers as defined in Section
214(e) of the Communication Act of 1934 will receive universal services
support. 62 Accordingly, the telecommunication carrier must be classified as
common carriers and offer, throughout a designated area, all of the services
supported by universal service. 63
60 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 254(a)(2) (1996).
61 Recommendation of the Joint board, CC DOCKET 96-45, November 7, 1997.
62 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 254 (e) (1996).
63 Communication Act of 1934, Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (Codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. Section 214(e)
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The Joint Board recommended that any telecommunication carrier,
including cellular or Personal Communication Services (PCS) providers,
regardless of the technology used, is eligible to receive universal support, as
long as it provides the proper services. 64 Carrier that receives universal service
support must use it only for the provision, maintenance, and upgrading of
facilities and services for which it is intended. The support has to be explicit
and sufficient to achieve the goal of universal sendee. 65
5) Who Has To Contribute?
The Telecommunication Act changed the universal service funding base to
spread the burden on all telecommunication carriers. It provides that every
telecommunications carrier engaged in the provision of interstate
telecommunications services must contribute to universal service through the
mechanisms established by the Commission. The Act also provides that
contribution must be equitable and nondiscriminatory and that the mechanism
of support be specific, predictable, and sufficient. 66 The Joint Board proposed
to reduce access charges to actual cost, and create a new mechanism to
finance universal service. 67 It proposed a contribution from all
telecommunication carriers, based on a percentage of their telecommunication
revenues less the amount paid to the other carriers.
6) The State Authority.
The Act provides that a State may adopt regulations concerning universal
service, so long as it is consistent with the Commission's rules68 .
64 See Recommendation of the Joint board, CC DOCKET 96-45, November 7, 1997.
65 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 254 (e)(1996).
66
Id at Section 254 (d)).
67 Recommendation of the Joint board, CC DOCKET 96-45, November 7, 1997.
68 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 254 (d) (1996).
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7) Specific Rules For Providers of Interstate Services.
The Act requires the Commission to adopt rules that prevent inter-exchange
carriers from imposing higher charges to subscribers in rural and high cost
areas, and from charging different rates from one state to another. 69
Ill- ACCESS CHARGES.
Introduction of competition in the local exchange could only succeed with
an appropriate system of access charges. Before the Act, a combination of
access charges and a rate averaging system funded the original system of
universal service. The system was one of implicit subsidies that created
confusion about competition in the inter-exchange market.
The Act called for an explicit rather that implicit system for funding
Universal Service. The Joint Board recommended that access charges be
reduced to their actual cost. 70 ILECs will be allowed to impose access charges
for the use of their unbundled switching elements until the access charge and
universal service reforms have been completed.
A) The New Regime of Access Charge
In the Access Charge First Report and Order, the Commission temporarily
allowed ILECs to recover: from interconnecting carriers:
- the carrier common line charge and
- a charge equal to 75% of the transport interconnection charge
for all interstate minutes traversing the incumbent LECS local
switches for which the interconnecting carrier pays unbundled
network element charges. 71
69
Id Section 254 (g).
70 Recommendation of the Joint board, CC DOCKET 96-45, November 7, 1997.
71 Access Charge Reform, 1997 FCC LEXIS 2591 (released May 16, 1997)(First Report and Order).
3This rule will expires at the earliest of (1) June 30. 1997. (2) inssuance of
final decision by the Commission in the Universal Service and access reform
proceeding, or (3) the date on which that RBOC is authorized under section
271 of the Act to provide in-region interLATA services, for any given state.
B) Rules For Specific Access Charges.
The following are examples of the new regime of access charges that the
Commission adopted after recommendation of the Joint Board." 2
1) Subscriber Line Charge ("SLC") and Common Carrier Line Charge
(CCL).
Both charges have been used by LECs to recover the cost of connecting a
customers to its end office. The Subscriber Line Charge was a flat subscriber
line charge imposed on customers. It was capped at S3. 5 per month. The
Common Carrier line charge that was based on time, and not connected to the
actual cost of the service provided to IXCs.
Under the new rules adopted by the Commission under recommendation of
the Joint Board. LECs are to recover a flat charge on each line from a
customer's pre-subscription for a long distance carrier." 3
2) Long Term Support Payments.
Long Term Support Payment charges were designed to support carriers with
higher subscriber cost lines than average. The LTSP system allowed all LECs
to charge a nationwide average interstate access rate. In this way. the excess
charged for low cost subscriber lines funded the high cost lines.
• See In Re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Sen-ice. 1 1 F.C.C.R. 13,7 8 ?%) (Report ar.d
Order), and also Access Charge Reform. 19<T FCC LEXIS 2591 (released Ma) 16, l997XFirst Report and
Order
i
" Access Charge Reform. 1997 FCC LEXIS 2591 (released May 16. 199~XFirst Report and Oi
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The Joint Board recommended that the principle of subsidy to the high cost
LECs continue under the new federal funding system. 74 The Commission
adopted the recommendation in the Access Charge Report and Order.
3) Link Up America and Lifeline.
Link up America and Lifeline were created to pay a portion of the telephone
installation charges for the low-income consumers. The usual shifting of cost
from the LECs to the IXCs funded these subsidies. In the Access Charge
Order, the Commission adopted the recommendation of the Joint Board that
these subsidies should continue under the new universal service mechanism.
They will be funded by non-discriminatory contribution from all interstate
telecommunication carriers.
74
In Re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 1 1 F.C.C.R. 13,708 (1996) (Report and Order).
32
PART TWO: SPECIFIC REGULATION.
All telecommunication carriers have to abide by the general regulation of
telecommunication carriers. However, certain have additional duties under the
Act, due their historical position (RBOCs), to the market configuration (LECs),
or the desire to promote competition. (CMRS).
SECTION I: SPECIAL TREATMENT OF THE REGIONAL BELL
OPERATING COMPANIES.
Since the Telecommunication Act removed all the line of business
restrictions, telephone companies are able to enter other segments of the
industry. This implies two important changes in the status of the RBOCs. The
Act took away their monopoly situation in the LX market, and allowed them to
enter the long distance market. However, Congress was well aware that merely
opening the local exchange telephony to competition would still leave the
former RBOCs with an enormous advantage over potential competitors. As a
result of the Modified Final Judgment, GTE and the RBOCs currently own the
quasi totality of the local network. Therefore, the 1996 Act requires RBOCs to
implement principles of open access and mandatory unbundling to prevent
that they leverage their control over the local loop bottleneck to enter new
markets. 75 For example, RBOCs could leverage their position in the LX to enter
the IX market by bundling local and long distance services. The act of
leveraging for a monopolist is considered by antitrust laws as an abuse of
dominant position, in violation of Section II of the Sherman Act. 76 The abuse of
domination over a bottleneck facility has sometimes been treated under the
doctrine of essential facility. 77
75 See definition of leveraging supra note 39.
76 See Berkley Photo Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979), "The use of monopoly
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An essential facility can be defined as "a productive input that others
cannot duplicate feasibly or economically." Some authors have made the
pertinent remark that "[r]egulatory principle of open access and mandatory
unbundling have their counterpart in antitrust law in the form of essential
facilities doctrine." 78
Drafters of the Act took into account the leverarging risk as well as the
phenomenon of economies of scale and sunk costs that characterize entry in
the LX market when they reorganize the LX regulation.
Because Congress did not rely on the RBOCs themselves to introduce
competition, it established a system where new entrants can use the
incumbents' network elements in order to start competing while gradually
developing their own networks. Incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs")
have to comply with an additional set of obligations designed to reduce their
bargaining power during negotiations with new entrants. This includes must
compulsory access, interconnection and unbundling requirement as well as a
regulatory scheme for negotiations. Also, to avoid leveraging in the IX market,
the Act conditions RBOCs' provision of long distance telephony on the proof
that LX market are open to competition.
I- MAKING THE INCUMBENTS' NETWORK AVAILABLE.
In addition to building its own network, a new competitor in the local
exchange market is allowed to use the ILECs Network. The Act lists different
possible uses of the incumbent's network.
power attained in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation of Section 2, even if
there has not been attempt to monopolize the second market."
77 See Otter Trail Power Co., v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
78 See J. Gregory Sidak and al., supra note 14, p 48.
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One is the resale of telecommunication services bought from Incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers. A telecommunication carrier may also interconnect
with the incumbent's network to add value to its own by allowing its customer
to access those of the incumbent. Finally, the entrant may only need a portion
of the ILEC's network (unbundled part) to fill the gaps in its own network and
provide bundled services.
In any of these situations the competitor must negotiate with the incumbent
regarding the conditions of the sale, interconnection or access. One author
made the comment that the sharing of the incumbent's network with
competitors was also the way competition was introduced in the long distance
market after the divestiture. However, he makes the point that the position of
new entrant in the long distance market in 1982 was much more difficult.
Companies such as AT&T have a much better financial position than MCI had
in 1982 and can, if they wish, use the RBOCs network to make a quick and
massive entry into the local exchange market. 79
A) Resale of Telecommunication Services at Wholesale Rates.
Resale of telecommunication services allows competitors to enter the
market without having to build their own facilities. ILECs' obligation for resale
of telecommunication services concern "vertical components such as switching
services (call waiting, call forwarding), transmission services and the service of
local loop."80
79 Deonne L. Brunning, The Telecommunication Act of 1996: The Challenge ofCompetition, Creiton Law
Review, June
,
1997.
80 See J. Gregory Sidak and al., supra note 14, p 56.
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ILECs have to offer telecommunications services for resale at wholesale
rates to any telecommunication carrier, when those services are available for
customers who are not telecommunications carriers. 81 Wholesale rates are
defined as the retail prices less the costs that an incumbent would no longer
incur if it were to cease retail operation. Finally, ILECs cannot prohibit or
impose unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations on the resale
of such telecommunications service. 82
B) Incumbents' Obligation to Provide Interconnection.
The term interconnection, as used in the Telecommunication Act, refers to
the physical linkage of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic. ILECs
must provide interconnection to its network to any requesting
telecommunications carrier. Interconnection obligations concern the
transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access.
It must be made available at any technically feasible point within the carrier's
network. 83 The interconnection must at least equal in quality to that provided
by the ILECs to itself, its affiliates, or any other party to which the carrier
provides interconnection. Finally, interconnection must be provided at rates,
terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. 84 The
Commission identified a minimum set of technically feasible points of
interconnection at local and tandem switches. The Commission also clarified
that telecommunication carriers might request interconnection under Section
252(c)(2) to provide telephone exchange, exchange services access, or both.
81 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 251 (c)(4)(A) (1996).
82 Id Section 251 (c)(4)(B).
83
Id Section 25 1 ( c ) (2)(a) &(b)
84
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 251(c)(2)(c)& (d) (1996).
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Finally, the commission decided that, if requested, interconnection must be
provided to any telecommunication carriers, including IX carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Services providers. 85
C) Access to Unbundled Elements of the Incumbents' Network.
Before the Act was enacted, ILECs foreclosed competition in the local
exchange market by bundling special access services. Customers who wanted
to reach an IXC point of presence had to bypass entirely the ILECs or purchase
the overall LEC facility for special access.
Under the Act, ILECs have an obligation to provide to any requesting
telecommunications carrier nondiscriminatory access to network elements on
an unbundled basis, at any technically feasible point. 86 The Act provides that
the agreement must be based on rates, terms, and conditions that are just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. 87
Network elements can be defined as the physical equipment, function and
systems used in the transmission of telecommunication services. 88 They are a
distinct part of the network independently available at a lesser price than the
overall. As one author explain, "[r]egulatory definitions of individual services
and "network" components are necessarily arbitrary, for any service is a bundle
of features.
"
89
85
First Report and Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96- 98, 95- 185, 1 1 FCC Red, 15,499 (1996).
86
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 251 (c)(3) (1996).
87
Id.
88
J. Gregory Sidak and al., supra note 14, p 52.
89
Id
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In the Fist Order, the Commission identified a minimum set of network
elements that the ILECs must provide. 90 States Commissions may require
incumbents to provide additional elements on an unbundled basis. Access to
the network elements must be provided in a manner that allows requesting
carriers to combine such elements to provide telecommunications service. The
Order requires the ILECs not to impose any restriction upon the use of the
network element.
D) Obligation of Physical Co-Location.
A delicate question in the negotiation of interconnection agreements is
whether the equipment necessary for interconnection should be located inside
(physical co-location) or outside (virtual co-location) the ILECs premises. This
provision is at the heart of a conflict of interest between the Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers and requesting carriers. The former who prefer virtual
collocation in order to protect their investment. The latter prefer physical
collocation in order to use their investment in equipment, internal
standardization and procedure.
Prior to the Act, the FCC ordered ILECs to offer physical collocation to all
interconnectors requesting it. Interconnectors and ILEC would be free to
negotiate a virtual collocation arrangement if both parties chose it. However, in
June 1994, the U.S. COURT of Appeal for the District of Columbia reversed the
FCC order.
90 The Commission identified the seven following network elements: (1) network interface devices, (2)
local loops, (3) local and tandem switches (including all software features), (4) interoffice transmission
facilities, (5) signaling and call-related database facilities, (6) operation support systems and information,
(7) operator and directory assistance facilities. First Report and Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96- 98, 95- 185, 11
FCC Red, 15,499(1996).
38
The Act of 1996 solved the dispute by adopting the physical collocation as a
general rule and virtual collocation as the exception for both the
interconnection and access obligations of ILECs. ILECs may provide virtual
collocation if they demonstrate to the state commission that the physical
interconnection is not practical for technical reasons or because of space
limitations. 91
The Act also requires the ILECs to provide for physical collocation at their
premises of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled
network elements on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory. 92
V) Notices of Change.
In order to limit anti-competitive behaviors by the ILECs, the Act requires
them to provide reasonable public notice of changes in the information
necessary for the transmission and routing of services using that local
exchange carrier's facilities or networks. The Act also requires notice of any
other changes that would affect the interoperability of those facilities and
networks. 93
II: REGULATORY SCHEME FOR THE AGREEMENTS'
NEGOTIATION.
In order to reduce the bargaining power of the ILECs, the Act establishes a
regulatory frame for the negotiation of resale, interconnection and access
agreements.
91
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 251(c)(6) (1996).
92
Id.
93 Id Section 251 (c)(5).
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The Act imposes first a duty to arrive at agreement through good faith. If no
agreement is reached, compulsory negotiations are organized, conducted by the
State Commissions. The Act provides two different regulatory schemes for the
compulsory negotiation, for resale and for interconnection or access
agreements.
A) RESALE AGREEMENTS.
Negotiations of agreements for resale of telecommunication services are left
to the parties. The Act only requires ILECs to charge wholesales rates. State
commissions will only intervene in the absence of agreement and determine a
default wholesale rate. This rate is computed "on the basis of retail rates
charged to subscribers for the telecommunications service requested, excluding
the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other
costs that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier."94
In the Fist Report and Order, the Commission set forth an "avoided cost
standard" methodology that states will use to set wholesales prices. 95 The
commission identified certain avoided costs and a methodology to guide the
state commission in the definition of the charges. State commissions have the
alternative to implement the methodology, or to select a discount rate from
within a default range that the Commission fixed between 17 and 25% off of
the retail price. 96
B) NEGOTIATION OF ACCESS AND INTERCONNECTION
AGREEMENTS.
The Act distinguishes between agreements arrived at through negotiation
and those arrived at through binding arbitration.
94 /^Section 252 (d)(3):
95
First Report and Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96- 98, 95- 185, 1 1 FCC Red, 15,499 (1996).
96 Id
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1) Negotiated Agreements.
During the first 135 days following a request for interconnection or access
to its network, the incumbent is free to negotiate with the requesting
telecommunication carrier. The only obligation is that the agreement must
include a detailed list of the charges for interconnection or access97 . In this
initial period, however, any party to the negotiation may ask the State
commission to mediate if difficulties arise in the negotiation. 98
2) Arbitrated Agreements,
a) The Process of Arbitration.
If an agreement is not reached through voluntary negotiation within 135
days, the State Commission will conduct a binding arbitration, upon request
from any party to the negotiation. 99 The party petitioning for arbitration has to
provide the state commission all relevant documents concerning the dispute,
the position of each of the parties with respect to those issues and any other
unsolved issue. 100 A non-petitioning party may respond to the petition and
provide additional information 25 days after the State commission receives the
petition. 101 State commissions must limit the arbitration to the issues set forth
in the petition and the responses and solve the issues by imposing appropriate
conditions upon the parties to the agreement. 102 The issue must be resolved
within 9 months from the date on which the local exchange carrier received the
request. 103
97 Telecommunications Act of 1996. Section 252 (a)(1) (1996).
98
Id Section 252 (a)(2)
99 Id Section 252 (b)(1)
100 A/ Section 252 (b)(2)(A)
101 Id Section 252 (b)(3)
102 Id Section 252 (b)(2)(B)
103 Id Section 252 (b)(4)
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b) Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith.
Both ILECs and the requesting telecommunication carrier have a duty to
negotiate in good faith during the arbitration. A party will be considered in "bad
faith" if it refuses to continue the negotiations or to cooperate with the State
commission acting as an arbitrator. 104
3) Determination of Regulatory Prices.
a) Prices for Interconnection and Access.
When no agreement is reached "naturally, State commissions must set the
prices for interconnection and unbundled elements. The Act provides that
prices must be just, reasonable, non-discriminatory, and based on actual
costs, including a reasonable and non-discriminatory profit. 105 In establishing
a methodology to establish the rates, 106 the Commission had to satisfy two
different objectives. First, the rates should allow the provider to fully recover
the cost of providing the service. Second, the rates must create a competitive
market with sound signals for investments, innovation and entry.
In the first order, the commission concluded that the prices for
interconnection and access should be based on the telephone companies' Total
Element Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC) of providing the particular
network element, plus a reasonable share of the forward-looking joint and
common cost. 107 This means that State Commissions, have to take into
account the effect of competition on the ILECs cost of capital and depreciation,
and the expected technological advances.
104
First Report and Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96- 98, 95- 185, 1 1 FCC Red, 15,499 (1996).
105 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 252 (d)(l)(A)&(B).
106 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 251 (c)(1)
107
First Report and Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96- 98, 95- 185, 1 1 FCC Red, 15,499 (1996).
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If State Commissions are unable to conduct a cost study and apply an
economic costing methodology within the statutory time frame for arbitrating
interconnection disputes, the commission has provided a default range of 0.2-
0.4 cents per minute for switching, plus access charge. For tandem switches,
the Commission established a default ceiling of 0. 15 cents per minute. The
Order also establishes default a ceiling for other unbundled elements.
b) Prices For Transport and Termination of Traffic.
The problem of charges for transport and termination of traffic is directly
related to the obligation to provide interconnection. One author comments that
"[o]pen access regulation ... [generally] imposes requirements on the regulated
carrier for the pricing and transmission of traffic originating or terminating on
another company's network." 108 The obligation to provide reciprocal
compensation for transport and termination is also imposed on LECs, but in a
less burdensome way. ILECs have a duty to provide "just and reasonable"
compensation. 109 The Act further provides that ILECs must allow "mutual and
reciprocal recovery by each" based on a "reasonable approximation of the
additional cost of terminating calls." 110
The 1996 Act requires that charges for transport and termination of traffic
be based on actual costs. 111 In the Local Competition Order, the Commission
concluded that state Commissions, during arbitration, should set symmetrical
prices based on the local telephone company's forward looking costs. 112 State
Commissions are also directed to use the Total Element Long-Run Increment
Cost (TELRIC) method in establishing rates for transport and termination.
108
J. Gregory Sidak and al., supra note 14, p 52.
109 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 252 (d)(2)(A)(i) (1996).
110 Id Section 252 (d)(2)(A)(ii).
111 /^Section 252(d)(2)(A).
112
First Report and Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96- 98, 95- 185, 1 1 FCC Red, 15,499 (1996).
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The Commission established a default rate of 0.2- 0.4 cents per minute for
end office termination for states that have not completed a TELRIC cost study.
Finally, it established that additional reciprocal charges could apply to
termination through a tandem switch. The default rate for tandem switching is
0.15 cents per minute, plus applicable costs for transport from the tandem
switch to the end office. 113
4) Approval of Interconnection and Access Agreements.
State Commissions have to approve all interconnection and access
agreements, whether or not an agreement was reached through arbitration.
Approval will be refused if the agreement discriminates against any party, or if
the agreement is against the public interest. 114 The Act limits the grounds on
which the State Commissions may reject an agreement. When the agreement
is reached through negotiation, it will be refused if it discriminates against any
telecommunication carrier, or, if it is against the public interest. 115 When the
agreement was reached through arbitration, the PUC will check that the
requirements in Section 251 were respected. 116
Conclusion: The Act Is Being Challenged.
The FCC's efforts to implement the Act's unbundling and interconnection
provisions have stalled in court. The U.S. Court of Appeal for the 8 th Circuit
vacated the pricing rules of the Commission. 117 On behalf of the Court, Judge
David R. Hansen wrote, "the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating the
pricing rules regarding telephone services." 118
} Id
4
A/Section 252 (e)(1).
5 Id Section 252 (e)(A)(i)&(ii).
6
Id.
7 Iowa Utilities Board, v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418 (8 th Cir. 1996).
8 Wat 7.
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The rules were vacated on jurisdictional grounds alone, without review on
the merits. Some commentators analyzed the issue as 'resolving the takings
and contract issues that resulted from the competitive transformation of the
network industries."119 They make the comment that there is an inextricable
link between pricing of network access and the scope of mandatory
unbundling." The controversy focuses on the choice between two alternatives
in the pricing rules. First regulators can take into account the historical costs
of building the network and the fact that the ILECs" networks are taken by the
new legislation m order to introduce competition. On the other hand, they can
decide that, regardless of the history, the prices will have to be based on cost.
The Commission chose the last alternative through the TELR1C method. The
Supreme Court, who granted certiorari, will have to solve the issue.
Ill: CONDITIONAL ENTRY INTO THE LONG DISTANCE MARKET.
Introduction of competition in the long distance market will only complete
when RBOCs are permitted to provide long distance telephony services.
Consequently, the Act of 1996 permitted RBOCs to offer out-of-region services
immediately after the Act's enactment. :2C However, the RBOCs have to show
competition in their local exchange market before being permitted to offer long
distance services originating or terminating in their region. : - : This provision
was prompted by the fear of regulators that the RBOCs could leverage their
market power m the LX market to enter unregulated markets and engage in
predatory pricing war with competitors.
See J. Gregory Sidak and al. supra note "2 a: p 565
:: Telecommunication act of 1996. Section 2 7 1(c)(1)(A)
121
Id Section 271.
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For RBOCs to offer in-region long-distance services (originating or
terminating in their former monopoly region), there must be one or several
facility-based competitors in the considered region. If not it must be
established that there was no request for access or interconnection by a facility
based competitor. Another condition concerns interconnection requirements.
Finally the Act establishes the procedure to be followed by the FCC.
I) RBOCs' PROVISION OF IN-REGION LONG DISTANCE
SERVICES.
To gain authorization to offer long distance service to their own local
clientele, RBOCs must have reached at least one agreement with an existing
competitor. Permission will be granted if, through the agreement, the RBOC
has provided to its competitor all of the following elements:
(1 ^interconnection and access to unbundled network elements as
required in section 251 (b) of the 1996 Act,
(2)-access to the RBOCs pole, conduit and other rights of way,
number portability, dialing parity, reciprocal compensation
arrangement and availability for resale, as required in Section
251(c) of the Act, and,
(3)-access to local loop transmission, local transport and local
switching.
The competitor must be a "facility based competitor, providing local services
exclusively or predominantly over its own facilities. The condition is not
fulfilled if the competitor only resells the RBOCs services. This provision was
included to ensure that powerful and independent competitors compete with
the RBOCs before they can be unleashed. The competitor must also be
operational. In this way, the FCC can check the list based on a real agreement.
4b
If RBOCs receives no request for interconnection, they can still apply for the
permission to offer Long Distance services. To receive permission in such a
circumstance, the RBOC has to file a statement containing the terms and
conditions under which it is ready and willing to offer the elements of the
checklist. 122 RBOCs can also request permission by filling a statement when
the competitor has fail to negotiate in good faith, for example by attempting to
delay the RBOCs entry in the long distance market. 123
Once authorized, RBOCs can provide in region long-distance telephone
telecommunication, information services as well as other incidental services.
However, those services have to be provided through a separate affiliate. 124
II) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROVISIONS.
A) The Debate.
Some argue that the basis for RBOCs' restrictions to provide in-region long-
distance services; the threat of leveraging, does not exist and therefor the
restriction should be relieved. Two authors comments that "[a] growing
number of scholars ... have questioned the plausibility of [the theory of
leveraging], or the need to resort to a quarantine to prevent the perceived
competitive risks." 125
They comment that RBOCs will suffer a great competitive disadvantage with
entrants able to provide "one-stop-shopping" services. 126 Telecommunication
carriers such as AT&T and MCI will soon propose integrated LX and IX services
that the RBOCs won't be able to provide unless the barriers are withdrawn.
122 Id Section 27 1 (c)( 1 )(A) & 272(a)(2)(B).
123 Id Section 271 (c)(1)(B).
124
Id Section 273(h).
125 See J. Gregory Sidak and al., supra note 14 at p 35.
126
Id.
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Also, they argue that "[e]ntry of the RBOCs into the provision of interLATA
services would enhance competition in those markets." 127 RBOCs' technological
and business expertise could bring substantial improvement in the services
offered to customers. 128 Following this view, the constitutionality of the
provisions were challenged in court.
B) Challenge In Court.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that
Sections 271 to 275 of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 were an
unconstitutional bill of attainder, i.e., a "legislative act that inflicts punishment
without a judicial trial." 129 The FCC and the United States appealed judgement
of the District Court before the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit. The Court
of Appeal reversed, ruling that the provisions were not a bill of attainder in the
sense used by the Supreme Court. More generally, the Court held that the
provisions were consistent with the constitutional requirements of separation
of power, equal protection, and free speech. 130
Ill) THE ACT BLOCKS RBOCs' STRATEGY.
The scheme of the Act is blocked because competitive carriers hesitate to
enter the LX market, except for those high-consumption business customers.
They profit of RBOCs' system of internal subsidy to provide alternatives to
business customers. Indeed RBOCs subsidize low residential rates by charging
businesses above cost.
Furthermore, in the, the FCC, implementation of the Act, has shown that it
had a very tough standard of what an open market means.
127
Id p 96.
128 See Id at p 97.
129 SBC Communication, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F.Supp. 996.
130 SBC Communication, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226 (5 th Cir. 1998) [No. 98-10140, Sept. 4, 1998]
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Even Bell Atlantic, with tremendous effort to open LX markets, is still
precluded from entering the IX market.
Following the industry evolution, RBOCs are in the process of offering
broadband services, including residential/business security, entertainment,
electronic commerce, Internet access. Bell Atlantic has a plan to provide 2
millions (5 in 99) with regional platform of long-distance connections
throughout the east cost, able to carry voice data and video, based on packet
switching networks.
However, those services can only be provided if barriers to enter in the IX
market are lifted. Bell Atlantic and two other RBOCs have instituted a Notice of
Proposed Rule Making before the FCC. The idea would be to allow RBOCs to
offer high speed data services through separate subsidiary. The FCC could base
it on Section 706 on the TA96, and would, in this way, encourage long distance
carriers to enter the LX market.
SECTION III: SPECIFIC RULES FOR THE LOCAL EXCHANGE
CARRIERS.
One of the Act's most important tasks was the introduction of competition
in the local exchange market. The rational of the Act was that technological
developments in the telecommunication industry had rendered the "natural
monopoly" theory obsolete in the provision of local telephony services. To
ensure competition in the local exchange market, however, the Act had to deal
with the specific configuration of the telephone network. The complexity of the
current technology and its accompanying regulation "created a peculiar reality
where it is far easier to carry information thousand of miles across the country
than the last mile into a recipient's business or home." 131
131 Michael I. Meyerson, Idea to the market places: A Guide to the 1996 Telecommunication Act, Federal
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Local Exchange Carriers are the carriers that provide telephone exchange
services or service access. 132 Therefore they control the path necessary to
provide customers with any kind of telecommunication services. In order to
prevent local exchange carriers (LECs) from abusing the control they have on
this "bottleneck" facility, the Act imposes specific obligations that apply to all
LECs, both incumbent and challenger.
A) Telecommunication Services Available for Resale.
The Act requires Local Exchange Carriers not to prohibit, nor to impose
unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations on the resale of its
telecommunications services 133 . It is intersting to note that this obligation is a
reduced form of the duty imposed on Incumbent local exchange carriers
(ILECs). They, in addition, have to offer for resale at wholesale rates any
telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers
who are no telecommunications carriers. 134
B) Number Portability.
The Telecommunication Act defines "number portability' as:
"the ability of users of telecommunications services to retain, at
the same location, existing telecommunications numbers without
impairment of quality, reliability, or convenience when switching
from one telecommunications carrier to another." 135
Communication Law Journal, February 1997.
132 Telecommunication Act of 1996, Section 2 (40). The term exchange access' means the offering of
access to telephone exchange services or facilities for the purpose of the origination or termination of
telephone toll services.
]
" Id Section 251(b)(1)).
134 Id Section 251(c)(4)(B)
135
/cr Section 3(b) (46).
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Local Exchange Carriers have to provide, to the extent technically feasible,
number portability in accordance with requirements prescribed by the
Commission. 136
C) Dialing Parity.
According to the Act, "dialing parity' means that:
"a person that is not an affiliate of a local exchange carrier is able
to provide telecommunications services in such a manner that
customers have the ability to route automatically, without the use
of any access code, their telecommunications to the
telecommunications services provider of the customer's
designation from among 2 or more telecommunications services
providers." 137
LECs have the duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers of
telephone exchange service and telephone toll service. They also have the duty
to provide them with nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers, operator
services, directory assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable
dialing delays. 138
D) Access to Pole, Conduit, and Right-of-ways.
LECs have an obligation to afford access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and
rights-of-way of such carrier to competing providers of telecommunications
services on rates, terms, and conditions that are consistent with section 224. 139
136 /^Section 251(b)(2)).
137
Id Section 3(b) (39)
138 Id Section 251(b)(1)).
139
Id.
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£) Reciprocal Arrangement.
According to the Act, local exchange carriers must "establish reciprocal
compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of
telecommunications." 140 Transport involves the transmission of
telecommunication traffic from the point of physical interconnection between
two carriers to the LEC switch that serves the called party. 141 Termination
encompasses the remaining portion of the call: switching of the traffic on the
LEC switch and delivery of the call to the called party's telephone. 142 By
collecting transport and termination costs, the LECs recover the costs of
complementing a call originated by another carrier.
SECTION II: REGULATION OF CMRS.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 amended Section 332 of
the Communication Act of 1934 to create two categories of mobile services:
commercial mobile radio services ("CMRS") and private mobile radio services
("MRS"). CMRS is defined as "any mobile service that is provided for profit and
makes interconnected service available (A) to the public or (B) to such class of
eligible users as to be effectively available to a substantial portion of the
public." 143 Private mobile radio service is defined as "any mobile service that is
not commercial mobile service or the functional equivalent of a commercial
mobile service...." 144
140
Id Section 25 1(b)(5)).
141 The FCC defines transport as "the transmission and any necessary tandem switching of local
telecommunication traffic ... from the interconnection point between two carriers to the termination
carrier's end office switch that directly serves that called party." 47 C.F.R. Section 51. 701(c)(1996).
142 The FCC defines termination as "the switching of local telecommunication traffic at the terminating
carrier's end office switch, or equivalent facility, and delivery of such traffic to the called party's
premises." Id at Section 51.701(d).
143 Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. Section 332(d)(1).
144 Id Section 332(d)(3).
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The statute directed the Commission to implement these provisions and to
provide for comparable regulation for substantially similar CMRS services.
The regulation applicable to CMRS operators is in many way advantageous
compare to other carriers. Especially, they have the ability to enter the LX
market with a reduced regulatory burden.
I) Wireless Local Loop: PCS Licensees' Ability to Provide Fixed
Integrated Services.
The FCC was requiring wire-line cellular operators to offer unrestricted
resale of their service to allow non-wire-line carriers to offer services while
building their facilities. This obligation was repealed once competition was
fully introduced. Section 24.3 of the FCC rules says that licensees may provide
any mobile communication services on their assigned spectrum. Fixed services
may be provided on an ancillary basis to mobile operation. 145 The uncertainty
of PCS providers as to whether they can provide fixed services is due to the lack
of definition of the term "ancillary" by the Commission.
II) CMRS and The Telecommunication Act Of 1996.
CMRS carriers are defined as carriers providing mobile services on a for
profit basis that is available to the public. 146 Although they have been qualified
as telecommunication carriers, they benefit from favorable regulatory
treatment. The Telecommunication Act exempts them from obligation imposed
on LECs. 147 In the Local Competition Order, the Commission concluded that
CMRS carriers should not be classified as LECs for the moment. 148 Second,
LECs have an obligation to provide interconnection with CMRS providers.
145
Personal Communication Services, Second Report and Order, 47 C.F.R. Section 24.3 (1994).
146 47 C.F.R Section 20.1 1 (1994).
147 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 2 (44): The term local exchange carrier' means any person
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In the Local Competition Order, the Commission concluded that CMRS
providers are telecommunication carriers and therefore are entitled to
reciprocal compensation under section 251 (b)(5) of the Telecommunication Act
of 1996.
1
54
B) Jurisdiction.
Section 6002 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 155 amended
section 332 of the Communication Act of 1934 156 to preempt state regulation of
entry into the wireless market and state regulation of rates charged by wireless
service providers 157 . Section 6002 also granted the FCC authority to regulate
interconnection between CMRS providers and other common carriers.
IV) RBOCs Operating In-Region CMRS.
In 1981, the Commission authorized two cellular licenses in each market,
one wireline, one non-wireline. 158 To preclude wireline carriers from using their
market power to implement anti-competitive practices , the Commission
required them to provide cellular services through a structurally separate
affiliate. 159 The non-wire-line cellular carrier could, on the other hand, operate
without structural safeguards. After the Divestiture, 160 the FCC transferred the
separate subsidiary requirement to the RBOCs. 161 Later, the Commission
renewed the structural barriers for RBOCs operation of cellular, but refused to
extend it to the RBOCs' operation of PCS systems.
Mobile Services, Second Report and Order, 9 F.C.C. Red. 141 1 (1994).
153
Id. at 227-34.
154
Local Competition Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96- 98, 95- 185, 1 1 FCC Red, 15,499 (1996)( First Report and
Order).
155 Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
156 Ch. 652,48 Stat. 1064 (Codified as amended in scattered Sections of 47 U.S.C.
)
157 47 U.S.C. Section 332 (c)(3)(A) (1994)
158
In Re Inquiry Into The Use of the Band 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communication
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In the Local Competition Order, the Commission decided that because
CMRS providers such as cellular, Broadband PCS and SMR providers offer
telephone services, they may request interconnection on conditions prescribed
under section 251 (c)(2) of the Telecommunication Act of 1996. 149
III) LEC-CMRS Interconnection,
A)LECs' Duty to Compensate CMRS Providers for Termination
of Calls.
Mutual compensation is a compensation for the act of terminating calling
traffic when the calling traffic originates on one carrier's network and
terminates on the network of another. "... To date, the LECs have only clearly
recognized cellular carriers as having rights to compensation for terminating
calling traffic, and even then to a limited extent." 150 In 1987, the Commission
established the right of cellular providers to mutual compensation. The
Commission imposed on both the LECs and cellular carriers a duty to negotiate
in good faith. 151 In the Second CMRS Report and Order, the Commission
extended its LEC/ Cellular interconnection policy to CMRS providers. 152 In the
order, the Commission places an affirmative obligation on LECs to provide
reasonable interconnection to all CMRS carriers and to compensate them on
the basis of reasonable cost they occur in the termination of calls. 153
that is engaged in the provision of telephone exchange service or exchange access. Such term does not
include a person insofar as such person is engaged in the provision of a commercial mobile service under
section 332(c), except to the extent that the Commission finds that such service should be included in the
definition of such term.
148
Local Competition Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96- 98, 95- 185, 1 1 FCC Red, 15,499 (1996)( First Report and
Order).
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Paul G. Madison, Commercial Mobile Radio Services Carriers Are Entitled to Compensationfor Call
Termination, ComLaw Conspectus, Winter 1997, at 2.
IM See In Re To Promote Competition and Efficient Use of Spectrum For Radio Common Carriage
Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 4 F.C.C. Red 2369, Paras. 10- 29 (1989).
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In Cincinnaty Bell Telephone Co., v. FCC, the Court of Appeal for the 6 th
Circuit reversed the rules and held that the RBOCs should be able to operate
cellular and PCS services under the same regime. In a subsequent Report and
Order, the Commission determined that "all incumbent LECs, or independent
LECs will be required to provide in-region-broadband CMRS, including cellular
services, through a CMRS affiliate."
Conclusion.
Two major problems face the development of wireless communication as a
substitute for wire-line local loop: capacity and prices. However, technological
developments allow new services such as PCS to serve as a local loop with
more capacity (but less mobility) than cellular. In addition, it is less expensive
to install that a wire-line network. Low orbit satellites will provide another
alternative. However, because of the cost of operation, they will be used to
cover high cost areas. Technology such as Local Multipoint Digital Service now
allow wireless companies to compete in the provision of local loop services with
fixed antennae, especially in the rural areas. Finally wireless PBX can be used
as a substitute of wire-line networks for businesses, integrating mobile phone,
pager, wireless LANs ... etc. Recently AT&T purchased Macaw Cellular and won
auctions for numerous PCS licenses. This move will give AT&T the marketing
advantages to provide a package of long local and cellular telephone and
combined wire-line and wireless access.
Systems; Amendment of part 2 and 22 of The Commission Rules, Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469
(1981).
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160 United States v. AT&T Co., 522 F.Supp. 131, 140-43 (D.D.C. 1982).
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CHAPTER TWO: REGULATION OF INFORMATION SERVICES:
THE EXAMPLE THE INTERNET.
INTRODUCTION: BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERNET.
"The Internet was designed to be a decentralized, self-maintaining series of
redundant links between computers and computer networks, capable of rapidly
transmitting communications without direct human involvement or control,
and with the automatic ability to reroute communications if one or more
individual links were damaged or otherwise unavailable." 1
1. Development.
In the 1960's, scientists at MIT invented technology that would revolutionize
the world of telecommunication: packet switching communication that reduces
the content of what is transmitted to digital packets traveling independently
over the network. 2
In 1969, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched
an experimental project (ARPANet) for a packet switching network linking
military computer networks with university laboratories conducting defense-
related research. 3
' See Federal Communications Commission, Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper, Series 30,
Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future In Terms ofthe Past, August 1998,
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working papers/oppwp30.txt .
2
See Barry M. Leiner et al., A briefhistory ofthe Internet, 1997,
<http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief/html>.
See Jamie M. Nafziger, Time to Pay Up, Internet Service Providers ' Universal Service Obligation
Under the Telecommunication Act of 1996, John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law,
1997.
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In 1973, DARPA developed a system for seamless communication across the
multiple packet switching networks forming the ARPANet: the open-
architecture networking. It is based on common transmission and digital
reduction standards (TCP/IP) 165 DARPA also developed gateways allowing
packet switching transmissions to take place over different networks. The
gateways translate the data from the standard of one network to the standard
used by the other. 166 In 1983, the U.S. Defense Communication Agency
mandated the use of those protocols over the national computer network
In 1986, the U.S. National Science Foundation ("NSF") created a civil
version of the ARPANet designed to link researchers in different universities.
The NSFNet consists of a high-speed backbone network connecting six
supercomputing centers, and seven regional networks linked to the super
computers on one side, and to major Universities and research organizations
on the other side. 167 The NSF was funding the project for research and
educational purposes, and its Acceptable Use Policy excluded the use the use
of the system for business purposes. 168 The NSF decided that TCP/IP would be
the mandatory protocol for the NSFNET program, in recognition of the need for
a wide-area networking. The NSFNet is the ancestor of the actual "Internet."
As the system was very successful, it became overloaded in 1987. ANS
contracted with Merit, IBM and MCI to upgrade it. 169 In September 1990, the
three companies invested $10 millions in Advance Network & Service, ("ANS"),
a not-for-profit corporation created to provide an alternative network that
would allow commercial information providers to connect with the NSFNet. 170
165
Barry M. Leiner, and al, supra note 166,
166 See Jamie M. Nafziger, supra note 167 at 32.
167
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Hall R. Varian, Networks, Infrastrucure, and the New taskfor regulation.
The University Of Michigan Press, 1996, at 107.
168 Barry M. Leiner et al, supra note 166, at 101.
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In 1992, ANS was given the responsibility to manage the NSFNet. The
objective of the ANS was to build a backbone able to carry some 45 Mega bits
per second (T3). At the same time, the Internet was showing huge networking
potential, and many private networks like Prodigy and CompuServe decided to
join the big network. In 1996, the backbone had capacity of Gigabits per
second allowing any kind of information to run through the Internet.
The Internet 171 is the considered the first form of the Information Super-
Highways. It has had an exponential growth during these last years. By
January 1997, there were over sixteen million host computers on the Internet,
and more than 175 countries were connected to the Internet. As many as 40
million people around the world were estimated to access the Internet by 1997.
By 1998, the number using the Internet is estimated to have grown to over 100
million, with traffic on the Internet doubling every 200 days.
2. How Internet Functions?
The Internet is a web of various interconnected networks interoperable
through use of common or open protocols, the TCP/IP protocols. Any type of
computer (Personal computers (PCs), Macintoshes, workstations and
mainframes) can access the network anywhere and communicate at million of
bits per second over distant public and private networks running over any
medium (analog or digital phone lines, traditional network lines, fiber, cable
television facilities and wireless systems).
170 See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Hall R. Varian, supra note 171 at 108.
171 On October 24, 1995, the Federal Networking Council passed a resolution defining the term Internet:
"Internet" refers to the global information system that - (i) is logically linked together by a globally unique
address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow, (ii) is able to support
communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent
extensions/follow, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either
publicly or privately, high level services layered on the communications and related infrastructure
described herein.
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In its original conception, the Internet operated at three different levels of
networks. The first level is the "backbone," a set of "high bandwidth
communication paths built on the top of dedicated lines leased from telephone
companies." 172 At the second level are a series of regional networks
interconnected through the backbone. Finally, we have the local connections
through which Internet users can access the Internet. Local Internet Service
Providers connects the user's computer to a host computer. The host computer
then connects to the regional network, and to the Internet backbone.
Recently, the structure of the network has changed in a way that the
network of major providers such as MCI, Sprint, and AT&T directly
interconnect.
Although the Internet extensively uses the telephone carrier lines, it uses a
different technology to transport data. Telephone service uses circuit-switched
technology. This technology uses various switches to establish a dedicated path
between the users. Data is transported over a continuous waveform that
represents the content, which requires that the path be monopolized for the
time of the communication. The Internet is based on packet switching
transmission. The content of the communication is broken up into digital
packets that are sent in the network and makes their own way to the
destination. In this way, there is no need to establish exclusive communication
path. Packet-switching technology is based on two mechanisms;
"packetization" and "dynamic routing." 173
72
Dennis W. Moore Jr., Regulation ofInternet and Internet telephony through the imposition ofaccess
charges, Texas Law Review, November 1997.
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Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Hall R. Varian, supra note 171, at 1 10.
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Packetization. Every computer that sends data through the Internet breaks
the data into "packets" according a standard method called Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP). To this packets are attached some information
concerning their origin, destination and sequence number, so that the end
user's computer using the same protocol can reassemble them.
Dynamic routing. Once packets are created, the Internet Protocol (IP)
attaches to each a header containing routing information that every computer
along the transmission can read to move the packet closer to its final
destination. 174 Those computers are routers, disseminated throughout the
network, which regulate the flow of data at each connection point. With this
technique, the path to destination is determined independently for each packet,
and packets from the same communication may travel independently and may
take different path to reach the same destination. 175 By contrast, the
centralized public switched telephone network uses a single switch to connect
all users within one local exchange area. Packetization and dynamic routing
allow an efficient use of expansive high bandwidth lines because the network is
only used when the packets are sent. Communications do not monopolize an
entire path of the network as with circuit switched technologies. When the
packets reach their destination, the receiving computer reassembles the data
and requests the missing packets if any. 176
3. Internet Services.
Contrary to a common view, the Internet is not a service, but a facility that
enable infinite applications. The routing mechanisms of TCP/IP do not limit the
actual services provided through the Internet to end-users.
174
Jamie N. Nafziger, supra note 167 at 57.
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176 See Jamie N. Nafziger, Supra note 167 at 60.
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The Internet services "depend on higher-level applications protocols, such
as hypertext transport protocol ("HTTP"); file transfer protocol ("FTP"); network
news transport protocol ("NNTP"), and simple mail transfer protocol ("SMTP"). 177
"Because these protocols are independent of the Internet itself, a new
application-layer protocol can be operated over the Internet through as little as
one server computer that transmits the data in the proper format, and one
client computer that can receive and interpret the data." 178
By the late 1980s, the primary Internet "services" included e-mail, Telnet,
FTP and USENET news. E-mail, the most widely used Internet service, allows
users to send text-based messages to each other using a common addressing
system. Telnet allows users to "log into" other proprietary networks, such as
library catalogs, and to view data as though they were directly accessing those
networks. FTP allows users to "download" files from a remote host computer
onto their own system. Finally, USENET "newsgroups" enable users to spot
and review messages on specific topics. 179
The most spectacular Internet application is the World Wide Web, a giant
global distributed database of multimedia (text, still images, sounds, and video)
documents stored in different computers that are connected to the Internet.
"The Web links together disparate information on an ever-growing number of
Internet-linked computers, "isoit was developed at the European Particle
Physics Lab (EPPL) to allow physicists working in different places of the world
to communicate through their computers. Instead of relying on standard
hardware and software, EPPL developed three different protocols.
177 See Barbara Esbin, supra note 170.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180 See Barbara Esbin, supra Note 170.
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The Hypertext Markup Language HTML is a standard format for Web
documents that allows them to be formatted richly. It is also, attaching a tag to
a document (hyperlinks), linking it to other documents using URLs, which
allows access to them by a simple click, without re-dialing another number.
URLs (Uniform Resource Locators) is a universal/ standard addressing system
specifying a type of Web document, the domain name server where it is to be
found, and the location of the document on the server's disk
(http://www.wcom.com). Finally, Hypertext transport protocol (HTTP) is a
protocol for moving hypertext files across the Internet. It requires a HTTP client
program on one end, and an HTTP server program on the other end. 181
In 1993, Marc Anderssen invented "Mosaic," a software allowing users with
any kind of hardware and software to view any on-line information from all
around the world. In February 1993 he placed the software on the University of
Illinois Web site, allowing anyone to download it for free. The use of Mosaic
grew 1 1 % per week between February and December 1993. When the product
reached wide acceptance, Anderssen transformed Mosaic into a commercial
product called Netscape. The owning company subsequently went public and
Anderssen became an instant multi millionaire. 182 Search engines, such as
"Yahoo," "Lycos," and "Magellan," have been developed to allow users of the
Web to search for particular information among all of the public sites that are
part of the Web.
4. Service Providers.
No one controls the Internet. Each network provider that is interconnected
with the global Internet controls operational aspects of its own network.
181 See definition of HTML, HTTP, and URL at the MCI/WorldCom communication library,
<http://www.wcom.com/tools-resources/communications_library/index.shtm>
182 See Don Tascott, supra note 1 at 39.
Online service providers, in addition to Internet access, provide access to
proprietary computer networks containing extensive and well-organized
content. Collectively, the "Big Five" online service companies -- America Online,
Inc., ("AOL") CompuServe (CompuServe was later acquired by AOL), Microsoft
Corp., Prodigy, Inc, and AT&T Corp.'s "WorldNet" served 88% of the total
audience. 183
Internet Service Providers allow the end user to connect to the Internet
using his or her own computer. "Content providers make information available
on 'servers' connected to the Internet, where it can be accessed by end users."
By mid- 1997, there were about 4,800 ISPs in North America alone. Both ISPs
and online service providers transport TCP/IP packets to the next IP router up
the line, typically a mid-level or backbone Internet gateway.
There are several kinds of ISPs. "Backbone" ISPs specialize in high-speed
long haul circuits, and they employ large, fast routers and switches to provide
their service. "Backbone providers" "route traffic between Internet access
providers, and interconnect with other backbone providers." "Dial-Up" ISPs
specialize in many points of presence, which accept local dial-in calls from
clients using modems. "Backend" ISPs specialize in Web hosting management,
carrying frequently requested information to additional servers located next to
large populations of users. "Frontend" ISPs specialize in high-performance
access and data caching for local user populations. 184
Until recently, there were five Internet "backbone" suppliers in the United
States handling approximately 80 percent of the nation's Internet traffic; MCI
Communications, Sprint, UUNet Technologies Co (subsequently acquired by
MFS), BBN (later a unit of the GTE Corporation), and ANS.
183 See Barbara Esbin, supra Note 170.
184
Id.
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Worldcom Inc., a Jackson Miss, telephone company, has become the
principal Internet backbone provider through a series of subtle acquisitions. In
early September, 1997 it acquired CompuServe and then sell its consumer
subscription service to AOL, the largest on-line provider in the U.S. In return,
AOL was to sell its Internet telecommunications unit, ANS, to WorldCom.
WorldCom also became owner of UUNet through its purchase of MFS
Communications. In early October 1997, WorldCom announced a bid to
acquire MCI Communications Corp., another significant provider of Internet
infrastructure.
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PART ONE: INTERNET CLASSIFIED AS INFORMATION
SERVICE.
The 1996 Act established different regulatory regimes for providers of
"telecommunications" and "information" sendees. This classification was
created at a time when Internet was still in its infancy. Now that the Internet
has developed, it provides interactive broadband services that are an amalgam
of telecommunication and information services. Regulation of the Internet
therefore starts with a delicate question of classification between heavily
regulated telecommunication, or unregulated information. Since the beginning,
interactive computer services (also called enhanced services) have benefited
from a consensus to avoid unnecessary regulation and undue restrictions (The
Computer Inquiry Decisions). Following this trend, the Commission classified
Internet-based services and Internet service providers as "information" services
and information service providers (II).
I) THE COMPUTER INQUIRY DECISIONS.
The Commission initiated the "Computer Inquiry" proceedings in 1966 to
separate the regulatory treatment of computer services involved in the means
of communication from those that perform data processing services. The goal
was to allow telephone companies participate in competitive computer and data
processing service markets, with competitive safeguards to protect customers
and competitive service providers against unlawful cross-subsidization and
interconnection discrimination. 185
In "Computer I," the Commission distinguished three categories of computer
and communications services:
185 See Barbara Esbin, supra note 170.
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- Computer processing involved in the means of communications,
such as switching, regulated as common carrier offerings under
Title II.
- Computer services providing data processing to end users over
the telephone network that would not be subject to Title II.
- Hybrid services, integrated service that combine remote access
data processing and message switching, would be treated as
either data processing or communications services, depending on
which of the two functions were predominant in the particular
hybrid service. 186
Common carriers were allowed to enter the data processing market.
However, the Commission imposed structural barriers on common carriers over
a certain size to prevent them for engaging in anti-competitive behavior. They
were required to form separate entities to provide data processing. AT&T and
its affiliated Bell System companies were excluded from data processing market
by the antitrust consent decree then in effect. 187
In 1981, the FCC issued the "Computer Inquiry II" 188 and concluded that
firms providing services that merely enhance telecommunication services;
"enhanced services" should be exempted from common carrier's regulation. 189
n6
Id.
187 W.
188
In The Matter Of Amendment Of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulation (Second
Computer Inquiry) 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), modified , 84 F.C.C., 693 F.2d 198 (CA D.C. 1982).
189
In the "Computer Inquiry II," the FCC replaced the unworkable distinction between data processing and
telecommunication by one between Enhanced Services and basic services. Enhanced services are defined
as: "services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which
employ computer processing applications that act on the format, content, protocol or similar aspects of the
subscriber's transmitted information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information." See Id.
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Enhanced services are "those that employ computer processing applications
acting on the content, code or protocols of data, or which involve subscriber's
interaction with the computer databases." 190 Therefore, whereas basic
telecommunication services 191 were subject to title II regulation, enhanced
services remained unregulated. Also, the Commission required the major
carriers with local distribution networks, such as AT&T and GTE, to provide
enhanced services through corporate affiliates fully separated from their basic
services operations. Originally, the category of enhanced service provider
included only services such as answering machines and messages devices.
Some believe Internet Service Providers were included in this category because
at this time they were non-profit organizations. 192
In this decision, the FCC also decided that it would not regulate companies
offering ancillary communication and data processing as telecommunication
carriers. 193
Carriers that owned common carrier transmission facilities and provided
enhanced services were required to unbundle basic and enhanced services.
They had to offer transmission capacity to other enhanced services
providers under the same terms and conditions that they provided their own
enhanced services. 194
90 Henry E. Crawford, Internet Calling: FCC Jurisdiction over the Internet Telephony, CommLaw
Conspectus, Winter 1997, at 50.
191
Basic transmission services are defined as the "offering of transmission capacity for the movement of
information, including data processing, computer memory or storage, and switching techniques when used
solely to facilitate the movement of information." In The Matter Of Amendment Of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulation (Second Computer Inquiry) 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), modified , 84
F.C.C., 693 F.2d 198 (CA D.C. 1982).
192 See Carilyn Hirschman, Jockeringfor Position; Carriers Racefor the Winner's Circle ofAccess Charge
Reform, Telephony, Dec 9, 1996, at 1, "Historically, universities and research institution were the main
users of the Internet. Because of the non-profit nature of those institutions, it was felt that the system
should be available for little or no charge."
193
In The Matter Of Amendment Of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulation (Second
Computer Inquiry) 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), modified , 84 F.C.C., 693 F.2d 198 (CA D.C. 1982).
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When the Commission adopted its access charge plan in 1983, it gave
Internet Service Providers a temporary exemption to avoid impairing the
development of this industry. The FCC explained that the exemption would
last until the FCC finds a rate structure that would treat all exchange access
on the same basis. However the exemption was still in effect at the time of the
Telecommunication Act's enactment.
In the "Modified Final Judgment" the District Court for the District of
Columbia distinguished between "telecommunications" and "information"
services, and prohibited RBOCs, among other things, from providing interLATA
information services. 195 In 1987 RBOCs were allowed to provide voice-
messaging services and to transmit information services generated by others.
When the Department of Justice divested AT&T from the local telephone
service networks, the FCC instituted access charges to maintain affordable
rates for residential phone service, even to remote areas. 196
In the Third Computer Inquiry, 197 the FCC maintained the unregulated
status for data service carriers and authorized them to provide their customers
both enhanced services and telecommunication services for their customers. 198
194 Computer and Comm. Indus Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 1 98 ( 1 982).
195 United States v. AT&T Co., 522 F.Supp. 131, 140-43 (D.D.C. 1982), "the Modified Final Judgment."
196
"Access charges are per-minute fees paid to the Local Exchange Carriers by long-distance and cellular
providers to originate and terminate phone calls on the local networks." See Dennis. W. Moore Jr., supra
note 176, at 188.
197
In Re Amendment of Section 64.702 Of The Commission's Rules and Regulation (Third Computer
Inquiry) F.C.C. 85- 397 (released August 16, 1985).
198
Richard E. Wiley & Howard Polsky, Understanding the Computer III Inquiry, in Telecommunication
and the Law, 321,322 (Walter Sopranov Ed 1988).
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The Commission eliminated the structural barriers created by the MFJ, so
that RBOCs and AT&T could provide enhanced services on an "integrated"
basis (i.e., through the regulated telephone company). 199 However, it imposed
"non-structural" safeguards; the "open network architecture." The Commission
wanted to provide all enhanced services providers (ESPs) equal access to the
components of the RBOCs' telephone network, as well as the ability to select
network service elements not used by the RBOCs in providing their own
enhanced services. RBOCs had to provide a sendee- specific comparably
efficient interconnection (CEI) plan, and have it approve by the commission.
Other non- structural safeguards as accounting safeguards, were imposed on
RBOCs. Later, these requirements were extended to the GTE local exchange
companies.
II) THE NEW CATEGORIZATION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATION
ACT OF 1996.
The categorization of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 correspond to the
one used in the MFJ; telecommunication and information. Those categories
broadly correspond to the basic/enhanced distinction of the computer inquiry
decisions.
The term information service means:
"the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any
use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications
service."200
In Re Amendment of Section 64.702 Of The Commission's Rules and Regulation (Third Computer
Inquiry) F.C.C. 85- 397 (released August 16, 1985).
200 Telecommunication Act, Section (3)(2)(41).
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To provide continuity in the regulation of the Internet, the commission
decided that enhanced services as defined in the Computer decisions are
information service. The commission also established that protocol processing
services are considered information services.
1. Enhanced Services are Information Services
In the Non-Accounting Safeguards Order concluded that all of the services
that the Commission has previously considered being "enhanced services" are
"information services." 201 However, the Commission also found that "while all
enhanced services are information services, not all information services are
enhanced services." Under Commission's computer decisions, still in effect,
"enhanced services" are limited to services offered over common carrier
transmission facilities used in interstate communications. In contrast,
"information services" under the 1996 Act may be provided, more broadly, "via
telecommunications." Further, live operator telemessaging services that do not
involve computer-processing applications are information services, although
they do not fall within the definition of "enhanced services." 202
2. Protocol Processing Services are Information Services.
Protocol processing services are essential to the Internet because they allow
data to go from one network to another although they function on different
standards. In the implementation of the 1996 Act, the Commission
distinguished between two king of protocol processing services. 203
201 The Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 1997 FCC LEXIS 2591 (released May 16, 1997).
202 Id
203
Id
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First, the commission distinguished end-to-end protocol conversion service
that enables an end-user to send information into a network in one protocol
and have it exit the network in a different protocol. The Commission concluded
that this kind of end-to-end protocol processing services clearly "transform"
and "process" users' information, and therefore constitutes information
services under the 1996 Act. 204 The Commission also based its decision on de-
regulatory policy considerations supporting the conclusion that end-to-end
protocol processing services should be treated as information services.
The other category, that the commission calls "no net" protocol-processing
services are used to manage, control, or operate of a telecommunications
system or to manage a telecommunications service. The Commission
concluded that those services constitute telecommunication rather than
information services under the 1996 Act.
PART TWO: ASSYMETRICAL REGULATION FOR DIFFERENT
INTERNET PROVIDERS.
Although we have seen that Internet services have been clearly classified as
information services under the 1996 Act, the treatment of those providing
Internet services is very irregular.
I) INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS REGULATED AS
INFORMATION SERVICE PROVIDERS.
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") are entities that offer Internet access to
residential customers.
204 Such conclusion is based on the definitions of Information and telecommunication services.
Telecommunications are defined as "the transmission... of information... without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received." Id Section (3)(a)(48). The term 'information service'
means the offering of a capability for ... processing.... information via telecommunications.
"2
They are wholesale consumers of telecommunication services such as
dedicated circuit for high speed data transmission or multi line monitoring of
incoming data traffic. Internet access is provided to customers with a dial-up
connection established through their telephone line, a modem205 and a
computer. The ISP sets up a dial-up center that has modems, routers, WWW
servers, mail-servers to route the customer's traffic to the Internet backbone,
along lines generally leased from inter-exchange carriers such as AT&T or MCI.
When accessing the Internet, the user calls the dial-in site, which is co-located
with the switching equipment. Telephone companies have developed special
equipment to accommodate Internet access through the local loop. When the
user dials the single number assigned for access to the Internet, the equipment
connects the user to the original line. If this line is busy, the user is
automatically connected to a free line among several additional lines assigned
to that number. 206 Long distance carriers use the same technology to ease the
access from the Local Exchange Carriers central office to the Inter Exchange
Carriers central office. ISPs use the Public Switched Network at relatively low
costs because they are charged as regular business customers.
A) ISPs Classified As Interactive Computer Services.
It is clear from the Act that Internet Service Providers will not be subject to
common carrier or telecommunication provider's regulation.
The Act classifies InterLATA Internet access as "interactive computer
services."
)5 The term "modem" is a contraction for modulator-demodulator. It is a device that turns bits into waves
forms and back again.
06 L Haran Craig Rashes, The Impact of Telecommunication Competition And The Telecommunication Act
Of 1996 On The Internet Service Providers, Temple Environmental Law Technology Law Journal, Spring
1997.
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Interactive computer services are defined as "any information service
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or
system that provides access to the Internet and such system operated or
service offered by libraries or educational institutions."207 The Act provides that
"nothing in this section shall be construed to treat Interactive Computer
Services as common carriers or telecommunication providers." 208
B) No Universal Service, No Access Charge.
The Telecommunication Act of 1996 maintained the principle of universal
service but established a different funding base than access charges. This
raises the question of whether ISPs have to pay access charges, whether they
have to contribute to the Universal Service support mechanism, and whether
they benefit from Universal service subsidies.
1. Internet Service Providers and Access Charges.
In providing interstate long-distance service, inter-exchange carriers
("IXCs") use local telephone company facilities to originate and terminate calls.
The use of local telephone company facilities to originate and terminate long-
distance calls is referred to as "access service." Under Part 69 of the
Commission's rules, LECs receive access charges for providing IXCs with
connections to the LECs customers. The rules were designed to promote
competition in the interstate, interexchange market by ensuring that all IXCs
would be able to originate and terminate their traffic over incumbent LEC
networks at just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory rates.
207 Telecommunication Act of 1996, Section 230 (e)(2)(1996).
208 /c/Section 230 (e)(6).
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In 1983, the Commission determined that enhanced service providers
(ESPs) would be exempt from the access charge requirements, although ESPs
typically use the local exchange network to originate and terminate interstate
communications.
ESPs were classified as non-carrier "end users," exempt from Title II
regulation generally. Following those decision, ISPs have used the PSN at low
cost because they pay neither access charges nor charges for termination of
calls on the LECs network when information is downloaded.
In addition, they obtained connection with the public switched network
paying local business rates. Many LECs argued that the ISPs' exemption from
access charges encourages excessive and inefficient use of network resources.
Following Congress' mandate, the Federal-State Joint Board decided to
reduce access charges to actual costs. The question relevant for the IPSs is
whether they have to pay for the costs they incur. The Commission released its
First Report and Order in the Access Charge Reform proceeding on May 16,
1997 .209
The Access Reform Order concluded that ISPs would not be treated as
telecommunications carriers, but as access service end users not be required to
pay the carrier-to-carrier interconnection charges. 210 Incumbent LECs will not
be permitted to impose interstate per-minute access charges on ISPs. This was
in line with the goals of the 1996 Act that the Internet remains free from
regulation.
209
In Re Access Charge Reform, 1 1 F.C.C.R. 21,354 (released May 16, 1997)(First Report and Order),
at Sec. X, p 344. Or Access Charge Reform, 1997 FCC LEXIS 2591 (released May 16, 1997)(First
Report and Order).
210
Part 69 of the Commission's Rules.
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The Commission stated that the situation would remain the same until the
access charge system is fully implemented. 211
In the meantime, the Commission has asked the Network reliability and
Interoperability Council, composed of representatives of the industry, to
analyze the effect of Internet usage on the public switched network. 212 The
Access Reform Order was affirmed on review by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
This regulatory treatment allows ISPs to purchase lines at the standard
business rate that includes no per-minute-usage-based fee for incoming calls.
Telephone companies seek to overturn this exemption by arguing that ISPs
don't contribute for the cost they impose. Normal business users and long-
distance carriers pay a toll for each outgoing call made over the LECs' lines.
Since ISPs' modem only receive calls, the ISP pays no per call toll.
Under the concept of free local calls, when a connection is made to the local
dial-up ISP, there's no charge for either outgoing or incoming calls regardless of
its duration. Consequently, U.S. West tried to require ISPs to pay for the
construction of new switches and the installation of dedicated circuits before
receiving services.
However, the Public Utility Commission sanctioned US West, stating that it
shall install services to customers at non-recurring charges, as specified in its
tariffs. 213
2.1
In Re Access Charge Reform, 1 1 F.C.C.R. 21,354, at Sec. X, at p 3 14.
2.2 A/ p 287.
213
In Re U.S. West Communication, No. 96- 128. 1996 WL 350953
,
P.U.C., May 1996.
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2. Universal Service; Status of Internet Services and Service
Providers under Section 254.
Section 254 directs the States and the Commission to establish support
mechanisms to ensure the delivery of affordable telecommunications service to
all Americans, including low-income consumers, eligible schools and libraries,
and rural health care providers.
It provides that "every telecommunications carrier that provides interstate
telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and non-
discriminatory basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms
established by the Commission to preserve and advance universal service." 214
The Universal Service Order decided that Internet access is not a core
telecommunications service supported by universal service mechanisms. 215
The information service component of Internet access cannot fit into section
254(c)(1), which describes universal service as an "evolving level of
telecommunications services."
However, the Universal Service Order decided that all eligible schools and
libraries should receive discounts of between 20 and 90 percent from
telecommunications carriers on all telecommunications services, basic
"conduit" access to the Internet.
The Commission based its decision on:
- section 254(c)(3) (grants it authority to "designate additional services
for support"),
- section 254(h)(1)(B) (authorizes it to fund any section 254(c)(3) services,
214 Telecommunication Act, Section 254.
2,5
In Re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 1 1 F.C.C.R. 13,708 (1996) (Report and
Order).
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- section 254(a)(1) & (2) that mandate the Commission to define the
"services that are supported by Federal universal support mechanism,'
without specifying that they must be telecommunications services. 216
The Commission made it clear that discounts were not on the cost of
purchasing information content, but on "conduit" sendee that allows
classrooms to access to this content.
1. Non-Telecommunications Carriers May Receive Support for Internet
Access Services Provided to Schools and Libraries.
The Commission determined that sections 254(c)((3) and 254(h)(1)(B)
authorized support for telecommunications, Internet access and internal
connections provided by telecommunications carriers. 217
Thus, the same non-telecommunications sendees eligible for discounts if
provided by telecommunications carriers under section 254(h)(1)(B) are eligible
for discounts if provided by non-telecommunications carriers, such as cable
operators, under section 254(h)(2)(A).
2. Only Telecommunications Carriers Must Contribute to Universal
Service Support.
The commission decided that information and enhanced service providers
do not provide telecommunications services even if information services are
provided "via telecommunications."
216
Id
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Therefore they are not required to contribute to support mechanisms to the
extent they provide such services. 218
The Commission based its decision on the fact that:
. ISPs alter the format of information through computer processing
applications such as protocol conversion and interaction with stored
data, while the statutory definition of telecommunications only includes
transmissions that do not alter the form or content of the information
sent.
. Information services, although provided via telecommunications, by
definition involve "generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information." 219
The Act does not determine who shall contribute to the Universal service.
Instead, it provides that "[ajll providers of telecommunications services should
make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and
advancement of universal service."220
Every telecommunications carrier that provides interstate
telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and
nondiscriminatory basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient
mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve and advance universal
service.
The Commission may exempt a carrier or class of carriers from this
obligation when carrier's telecommunications activities are so limited that
contribution to the preservation and advancement of universal service would be
de "minimis
218
In Re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 1 1 F.C.C.R. 13,708 (1996) (Report and
Order).
2,9
Id, p 645.
220 Telecommunication Act of 1996, Section 254(b)(4)
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Any other provider of interstate telecommunications may be required to
contribute to the preservation and advancement of universal service if the
public interest so requires. 221
The contribution of ISPs to Universal Service depends on how ISPs are
classified under the Telecommunication Act of 1996. The Telecommunication
Act of 1996 distinguishes between telecommunication services and information
services.
In the Universal Service Report and Order, the Commission concluded that
Information Service Providers and Enhanced Service Providers are not required
to support Universal service to the extent that they provide Information Service
and Enhanced Service. 222
In the Universal Service Order, the FCC concluded that information service
providers are not required to contribute to the Universal Service support
mechanism to the extent that they provide information and enhanced
services. 223
3) ISPs Exempted From LECs' Obligation of Resale.
Section 34(a)(1) of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 codified several
aspects of the Computer Inquiry decisions. Companies that are not considered
a telecommunication carrier or service provider are exempt from most
regulations pertaining to the resale of telecommunication services. 224
221 Id Section 254(d)
222
In Re Federal State Joint Board on Universal Service, 1 1 F.C.C.R. 13,708 (1996) at p 788.
223 Id
Telecommunication Act of 1996, Section 34(a)(1).
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The Act of 1996 also provides that any person determined by to be engaged
in the business of providing telecommunications services or information
services may apply to the Federal Communications Commission to be qualified
as an exempt telecommunications company.
The FCC as to make a decision within 60 days of its receipt of any such
application filed. If an ISP resale its services to another carrier, he must apply
to the FCC to secure the exemption. Some people say, however, that the
exemption might not apply to the RBOCs.
II) RBOCs PROVIDING INTERNET SERVICES.
Under the new law, Internet services can fall within two different regulatory
regimes applied to the RBOCs. One is the general category of information
service. The regime applicable to RBOCs providing information services is
different from the regime that applies to other carriers.
RBOCs have to provide information services through a separate affiliate.
Internet services provided by a RBOC may also be classified as electronic
publishing service, which receive a different regulatory treatment.
a. Regulatory regime for RBOC Providing Information
Services.
The 1996 Act ended the prohibition against provision of interLATA internet
services by BOCs that was imposed by the MFJ.
SI
However, in order for BOCs' to provide interLATA information services, and
manufacturing activities, they must establish affiliated structurally separated
from any operating company entity that is subject to the requirements of
section 251(c) of the Act. 225
In addition, section 272 requires each affiliate to:
(1) operate independently from the Bell operating company; (2)
maintain books, records, and accounts in the manner prescribed
by the Commission which shall be separate from the books,
records, and accounts maintained by the Bell operating company
of which it is an affiliate; (3) have separate officers, directors, and
employees from the Bell operating company of which it is an
affiliate; (4) not obtain credit under any arrangement that would
permit a creditor, upon default, to have recourse to the assets of
the Bell operating company; and, (5) conduct all transactions with
the Bell operating company of which it is an affiliate on an arm's
length basis with any such transactions reduced to writing and
available for public inspection. 226
These limitations on RBOCs' ability to offer inter-LATA information services
will expire 4 years after the Telecommunications Act's enactment, unless the
Commission extends such 4-year period by rule or order. 227
The Commission found that if any Internet or information service,
incorporates a bundled, in-region, interLATA transmission component provided
by a BOC over its own facilities or through resale, that service may only be
provided through a section 272 separate affiliate, after the BOC has received
in-region interLATA authority under section 271.
Finally, as the "Computer III" decision is still in effect, BOCs wishing to
provide intraLATA Internet access service to connect end users to the Internet
currently must file, and receive approval of, CEI plans.
225
/rf Section 272 (a)(l)(A)-(B).
226 Id Section 272 (a)(1)(b).
227 /(/Section 272 (0(2).
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They must demonstrate that the underlying basic sendees are available on
an equivalent, unbundled basis to unaffiliated ESPs.
b. BOC Safeguards Under Section 274 for Electronic
Publishing
Although "electronic publishing" is included in the definition of "information
service," the 1996 Act organizes a different regulation for the provision of
electronic publishing services by the RBOCs. Section 274(g)(1) authorizes
RBOC to provide electronic publishing service disseminated by means of its
basic telephone service. However, the service has to be provided through a
"separated affiliate" or an "electronic publishing joint venture" that meets the
separation, joint marketing, and nondiscrimination requirements in that
section. This means that RBOCs are not required to comply with the
requirements of section 27 1 concerning openness of the local exchange
markets where the RBOCs operates.
"Electronic publishing" is defined in Section 274(h)(1) as, "the
dissemination, provision, publication, or sale to an unaffiliated entity or
person, of any one or more of the following:
news (including sports);
entertainment (other than interactive games)
;
business, financial, legal, consumer, or credit materials;
editorials, columns, or features;
advertising;
photos or images;
archival or research material;
legal notices or public records;
scientific, educational, instructional, technical, professional, trade, or
other literary materials; or other like or similar information.
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The telemessaging/ Electronic Publishing order found that electronic
publishing services may include services provided through the Internet or
through proprietary data networks. However, it concluded that a RBOC
providing access to introductory information and software (e.g. browsers) does
not constitute the provision of electronic publishing under section 274(h)(2)(C).
Section 274(h)(2) excludes from the definition of electronic publishing, the
common carrier provision of:
telecommunications service,
information access service,
information gateway service,
voice storage and retrieval,
electronic mail,
certain data and transaction processing services,
electronic billing or advertising of a BOC's regulated telecommunications
services,
language translation or data format conversion,
"white pages" directory assistance,
caller identification services,
repair and provisioning databases,
credit card and billing validation for telephone company operations,
E 911 and other emergency assistance databases, and
video programming and full motion video entertainment on demand.
Section 274(h)(2)(C) excludes the provision of "gateway" services from the
definition of electronic publishing services. The commission specified that so
long as a BOC merely provides access to a home page, or an initial screen that
does not include any of the enumerated content types in section 274(h)(1), it is
engaged in "gateway" services, and therefore does not fall within the electronic
publishing regime. 228
228 See Barbara Esbin, supra note 170.
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PART THREE: REGULATION OF INTERNET TELEPHONY.
Internet telephony is the name for a technology that allows transportation of
voice communication over packet switching networks. It uses the digital,
packet switching nature of the Internet along with its routing and addressing
standard to provide real-time video conferencing. Many devices are involved in
the process of Internet telephony. To use this technology, one needs a
computer with substantial processing power, a digital signal processor, a
modem with transmission capacity of at least 14.4 Kilobyte per second, micros
and speakers, and Internet telephone software. 22g This software translates
user's voice into digital packets and translates digital packets into voice.
Internet browsers send the packets on telecommunication carriers' networks
through Internet service providers.
Internet telephony delivers the same service than the "plain old telephone
service (POTS). However, Internet telephony requires high-cost equipment
compared to the traditional telephone equipment. Another factor to take into
consideration when comparing Internet and traditional telephony is that only
few software allow "full duplex" communication that "POTS" (plain ordinary
telephony service) provides. The inherent feature of Internet technology is that
packets containing the content of communication arrive sometime with delay,
and not in the proper order. Therefore, it is makes "a priori" unsuitable for real
time communication.
The regulation applicable to Internet service providers allows two long
distance callers, once they have the necessary equipment, to communicate for
the cost of local calls, plus the monthly fee paid to the ISP.
See D. W. Moore Jr., supra note 176, p 187.
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It is therefore a great potential competitor of traditional long distance
carriers. For this reason, a trade group representing medium and small long-
distance telephone companies has requested that the FCC regulate Internet
telephony software makers as telecommunication carriers.
On March 4, 1996, America's Carriers Telecommunication Association
("ACTA") filed with the FCC a petition for declaratory ruling establishing FCC
authority over interstate and international telecommunication services using
the Internet. They also filed for a special ruling maintaining the status quo by
immediately stopping the sale Internet telephony software and for the
institution of rule making proceeding defining the permissible communication
over the Internet. 23°
The ACTA petition raises two questions. First whether Internet telephony
constitutes telecommunication under the 1996 Act, and whether the providers
of the enabling software for Internet telephony should be regulated as
telecommunication carriers. In the following analysis, we will see that if
Internet telephony as a whole might be considered telecommunication, Internet
Softwares providers can certainly not be regulated as telecommunication
carriers.
The second question concerns regulatory parity, whether it is proper for the
FCC to maintain inconsistent regulatory treatment of competing enterprises
and services. Indeed, Internet telephony is surely a form of telecommunication
although it does not fit into classification of the 1996 Act. The decision of how
to regulate it will depend on Commission's views on the treatment of emerging
Internet technologies.
50
In re Provision Interstate and International Interexchange Telecommunication via the "Internet" by non-
tariffed, Uncertified Entities, Petition for Declaratory Ruling, Special Relief, and Institution of Rulemaking
of America's Carriers Telecommunication Association, RM 8775, at 1 1 (Mar. 4, 1996).
St.
The ACTA petition, although restricted in its scope, will be an occasion for
the FCC to adapt a regulation designed for old circuit switched networks to
packets switching networks..
I- QUALIFYING INTERNET TELEPHONY AND INTERNET
TELEPHONY SOFTWARES.
A) THE ARGUMENTS.
ACTA alleges that the "Internet is a unique form of wire communication,"
and that the providers of Internet telephony software operate as uncertified and
unregulated common carriers in contravention of the FCC rules and
regulations. ACTA argues that the imposition of common carrier regulation by
the FCC over Internet telephony software companies is required to maintain
regulatory parity. 231
This is required, they argue, since the increasing use of the Internet for
telephony "could result in a significant reduction of Internet's ability to handle
the customary type of Internet traffic."232 They also argue that it is against the
"public interest to permit long distance services to be given away depriving
those who must maintain the telecommunication infrastructure of the revenue
to do so." 233
Opponents, mainly developers of software for digitizing and decoding audio
data on computer network argued that the FCC lacks jurisdiction to regulate
the Internet and that Internet telephony cannot be regulated as
telecommunication carriers.
231 See Federal Communication Commission, Public Notice, Common Carrier Action, Common carrier
Bureau, Clarifies and Extent the Request for comment on ACTA petition Relating to "Internet phone"
software and hardware. RM No. 8875, CC 96- 10 (released Aug. 12, 1996).
232 See Id at 7.
233 Id at i.
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Some base their position on the fact that Internet telephony fit into the
definition of access software, 234 access software providers, 235 and interactive
computer services. 236 Netscape and other companies noted that the FCC
couldn't subject Internet telephony software providers to common carrier
regulation because their product is classified as enhanced under the FCC
computer inquiry decision, and Information services as defined in section 3 (20)
of the telecommunication Act of 1996. AT&T and Sprint disagreed with the
petition that Internet software qualifies as "transmission" or "communication "
as defined in section 153 of the Act. 237 Other asserted that the technical
problems associated with Internet telephony make it a different product.
Finally, opponents argue that Congress specifically abstained from
regulating the Internet when it drafted the Telecommunication Act of 1996, and
that Federal regulation would place an oppressive burden on this young,
emerging market.
B) ANALYSIS.
1. Is Internet Telephony Telecommunication or
Information Service?
Telecommunication services are defined in the Act as "offering of
telecommunication for a fee directly to the public, or to such class of users as
to be effectively available to the public, regardless."238 Therefore, to qualify
Internet Telephony as telecommunication services, one has first to establish
that it is telecommunication.
234 47 U.S.C. section 223 (h)(3).
235 47 U.S.C. Section 223, (e)(4).
236 47 U.S.C. Section 223 (e)(2)
237 Comment of AT&T Corp. In the Petition for Declaratory Ruling, Special Relief, and Institution of Rule
making in RM 8775, at 2 (May 8, 1996). Section 153 of the Telecommunication Act provides:
238 Id Section 153(46)
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The Act defines telecommunication as "Transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without
change in the form or content of the information sent or received."239 The
definition has three prongs. The first is that the transmission must occur
"between or among points specified by the user." This is not the case with
Internet telephony where the communication is limited to the users logged on
that server at the same time. Second prong of the definition requires that the
transmission be "without change in the form or content of the information sent
or received". Internet technology is based on the transformation of the
information into digital packets. Even if the message is rebuilt under the same
original form with the Transmission Control Protocol, this feature does not fit
the definition of the Act.
Finally, Internet telephony fits the definition of information services, which
is "the offering of a capacity for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunication." 240
2) Are Internet telephony software providers
telecommunication carriers.
One author concludes, "while Internet telephony itself may fall within the
new broad definition of telecommunication services, the enabling software
required for such use does not."241 As we concluded above, Internet Telephony
may or may not be qualified as telecommunication services. In the following
part, we will consider that Internet telephony is telecommunication to conclude
that even in such (improbable) case, the Internet telephony software companies
are not the providers of this telecommunication.
239 47 U.S.C. Section 1 53 (43) ( 1 99 1 & Supp. I 1 996).
240 Id
241 Robert M. Frieden, Dialing For Dollars: Should The FCC Regulate Internet Telephony?, Rutgers
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Finally, if Internet telephony software providers are classified as
telecommunication carriers, the FCC will have to apply regulatory parity only if
it finds that the two services are "equivalent."
a) Internet telephony Software Companies do not Provide
Telecommunication.
The Act defines telecommunication carriers as "any provider of
telecommunication services, except.... Aggregators who provide telephone
services to the transient population..." 242 Internet Telephony software is not the
device that transports the data from the sender to the receiver. So in the
language of the Act, the software providers are not providing
telecommunication services.
Conversely, Internet telephony software performs tasks that have been
specially defined and regulated in the Act. It is essentially an "access software"
that that the Communication Act of 1934, as amended in 1996, defines as:
"software or enabling tools that do not create or provide the
content of the information but allow a user to do anyone or more
of the following: (A) filter, screen, allow or disallow content, (B)
pick, choose, analyze or digest content; or, (C) transmit, receive,
display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, or translate
content."243
Additionally, it fits the category of Interactive Computer Services, defined in
the Act as:
"any information service system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such system operated or
service offered by libraries or educational institutions."244
Computer and Technology Law Journal, 1997, at 51.
242 Id Section 153(44)
243 Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. Section 223 (h)(3) (1996).
244 Telecommunication Act of 1996, Section 230 (e)(2)(1996).
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Those two categories are exempt from telecommunication carrier regulation
under the Telecommunication Act of 1996. 245
II- THE REGULATORY PARITY.
Eventhough Internet telephony does not fit into the definition of
telecommunication under the telecommunication Act of 1996, it still looks like
telecommunication. Under the regulatory parity rule, that the ACTA petition
raises, the FCC has to apply the common carrier regulation only if it finds that
Internet telephony and Message Telephone Services are equivalent. However,
there is a strong political consensus to favor the development of Internet
services by living them unregulated.
The commission has adopted this view several time; in the computer inquiry
decisions, and in the implementation of the 1996 Act. It is therefore predictable
that it will adopt the same view regarding the issue of Internet telephony.
Furthermore, since regulatory parity can be obtained either through
regulation of previously unregulated industry, or elimination of regulation for
traditional industries, it seem unlikely that the FCC will accept the ACTA
petition. The Commission can maintain regulatory asymmetry in two ways. It
may treat Internet telephony as information services. Or it may decide to
classify it as telecommunication, for more regulatory consistency, and grant it
an exemption from the applicable regulation. One author argues that
classifying Internet telephony as information service does not serve
Commission's intent is to favor the development of the Internet technology.
245 Id Section 230(e)(6).
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Instead of classifying Internet telephony providers as Information service
providers, the author argues that the FCC should classify them as
telecommunication carriers, and use section 160 of the Act246 to exempt them
from common carrier regulation. 247
246 47U.S.C. 160, sec. 10(1996).
247 Robert M. Frieden, Can and Should the FCC Regulate Internet Telephony? In Interconnection and the
Internet, Selected paper from the 1996 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Lawrence
Erlbaum Assocaites, 1997.
CHAPTER THREE: REGULATION OF VIDEO-PROGRAMMING.
History of Cable.
Cable television was developed in the late 1940's for communities unable to
receive TV signals because of the landscape or the terrain. Cable television
system operators located antennas in areas with good reception from TV
stations, picked up broadcast signals and distributed them by coaxial cable to
subscribers. 1 In March 1966, the FCC proposed a regulatory framework for
cable systems, concluding that regulation of cable was part of its legislative
mandate. 2 The Commission's jurisdiction over cable was confirmed in United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co. 3 The Court found that the Commission's
authority over cable was necessary for the preservation of local broadcast
service and for an equitable distribution of broadcast services in the various
regions of the country. 4
In March 1972, the Commission decided that cable operators must obtain a
certificate of compliance from the Commission before beginning operations. It
created a dual regulatory regime whereby the state or local government issued
franchises, while the Commission exercised "exclusive authority over all
operational aspects of cable communication. Additionally, cable television
operators who provided programming were subject to the same kind of
requirements as broadcast television, including equal time, the Fairness
Doctrine, sponsorship identification and financial forms.
1
Evolution ofCable Television, FCC Fact Sheet, Cable Television, Information Bulletin, august 1997,
at <www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/WWW/facts/csgen.html>
2
Id.
3 392 U.S. 157(1968).
4
See Evolution ofCable Television, Supra note 237.
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Later, in 1977, the Commission relaxed cable regulation, waiving most of
the franchise requirements. The certificate of compliance was replaced by a
registration system in 1978. 252 The financial conditions were deleted in 1983.
In October 1984, the U.S. Congress further deregulated the operation of
cable systems in the Cable Communications Policy Act. 253 The legislation was
designed to (de)regulate cable television, and establish the boundaries of
federal, state and local authority over cable systems. The 1984 Cable Act
exempted cable television operators from common carrier regulation insofar as
they provide "cable service." The Act, on the other hand confirmed the local
franchising system, codified the telephone-cable cross-ownership restrictions,
and establish franchise procedures and standards to encourage the growth and
development of cable systems. The goal behind deregulation was to favor the
development of cable systems capable of delivering both traditional one-way
television-like programming and two-way data and voice transmission services.
For this reason, the Act establishes a different regulatory treatment for
traditional "cable service" and two-way communications services such as e-
mail, facsimile transmissions and data processing.
Although deregulation spurred the development of cable, there was little
competition among distributors of cable services and the rates for cable rose
constantly. To remedy the situation, Congress enacted the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Congress intent was to
promote diversity through a competitive market place, and ensure that cable
operators did not have undue market power. 254
252
Id.
253 Cable Act of 1 984, Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1 064 (Codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. Section 151-613(1 994)).
254 Market power is "the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive
Market." National Collegiate Ass 'n v. Board ofRegent ofthe Univ. ofOkla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n. 38
(1984).
The Act created a dual system of price regulation to prevent Cable operators
from abusing their power. It also introduced competition in the video
programming market, allowing competitors to build competing cable systems.
However in 1995, when the Commission released its second annual report on
competition in the video programming delivery market, cable television systems
had market power in the market for distribution of multi channel video
programming in most markets. 255 The Commission reported that in the end of
1994, cable was reaching 96% of the television household (96.1 Millions). 256
The Telecommunication Act of 1996 was a new occasion to introduce more
competition in the video programming market.
Deregulation of the Video Programming Market.
One purpose of the 1996 Act was to further introduce competition in the
multi channel video-programming market place. The Act made two important
modifications to the cable systems regulation. Section 301 relaxes regulation
for cable operators, especially pricing regulation of the Cable Act of 1992 and
section 302 allows any entity to enter the industry. It is interesting to note that
before the enactment of the Act, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the 1
1
th circuit
held that the restriction was an unconstitutional burden on the companies'
right to free speech under the first amendment. 257
The 1996 Act, pursuing its objective of promoting the video programming
industry, removed the prohibition for a telephone company to provide video
programming to subscribers in their telephone service.. 258
55
In Re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video
Programming, Second Annual Report, 1 1 FCC Red. 2060 (1995).
56 See Norman M. Sinel and al., Recent Development in Cable Law, Practicing Law Institute, PLI Order
No. 64.4023, October 1997.
257
U.S. West v. United States, 48 F.d(Th Cir. 1992)). at 1092-1 105.
258 Cable Act, Section 613(b), 47 U.S.C. par 533(b).
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Congress' intent was to provide regulatory incentives for Local Exchange
Carriers to compete with the cable operators. The Telecommunication Act lists
four different regulatory regime under which video programming can be
provided. First, video programming can be provided under the traditional
regime applicable to the Cable operators. Provision of video programming can
be provided as a "Video Traffic System", under the regime applicable to
common carrier (Title II of the Communication Act). Video programming also
can be provided through wireless communication, as a "Radio Based System",
subject to Title III of the Communication Act concerning radio communication.
Finally video programming can be provided through the new "open Video
system" subject to a reduce version of cable regulation.
On January 2, 1997, the Commission released a new report on the status of
competition. 259 The Commission found that new providers of multi channel
video programming were increasing their market share through technologies
such as Direct Broadcasting Satellites, Wireless Cable and SMATV system.
However, it found that franchised cable systems were still the primary
distributors of multi channel video programming.
In this chapter we will analyze the different regulatory regime that video-
programming operator can be subjected to. First, the traditional cable
regulation, applicable to the incumbent operators. This is the heaviest
regulation, although it has been relaxed in the 1996 Act (part I).
We will then look at the newly introduced Open Video System, a lightened
regulatory scheme to encourage outside player, specially the RBOCs to enter
the video programming market (Part II).
59
In Re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Delivery of Video Programming (CS Dkt.
No. 96-133), FCC 96-496, 1997 WL 2451.
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Finally, we will look at the cable inside wiring rule, as they are an important
aspect of the future competitive environment (Part III).
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PART I: REGULATION OF CABLE.
Cable services were developed to receive and transmit analog broadcast
television signals by wire. They traditionally consisted of a series of channels
and services largely, but not exclusively, under the control of the cable
operator. Cable service has traditionally been regulated and delivered as an
integrated video, information content, and conduit service under Title VI.
Cable television is a video delivery service provided by a cable operator to
subscribers via a coaxial cable or fiber optics. Programming delivered without a
wire via satellite or other facilities is not "cable television" under the
Commission's definitions. Cable service means the transmission to
subscribers of video programming, or other programming service. 260261
According to the Commission, this term does not include:
(l)-a facility that serves only to retransmit the television signals of
one or more television broadcast stations;
(2) -a facility that serves subscribers without using any public
right-of-way;
(3)-a facility of a common carrier which is subject in whole or in
part, to the provisions of Title II of the Communications Act if
such facility is not used in the transmission of video programming
directly to subscribers, or,
(4) -a facility that provides interactive on demand services and an
open video system. 262
SECTION I: FRANCHISE REQUIREMENTS.
260
Evolution of Cable Television, supra note 237. A cable system is a facility, consisting of a set of closed
transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to
provide cable service which includes video programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers
within a community.
261
Id
Telecommunication Act of 1996, Section 651 -(a) (3).
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A cable operator must obtain a license in order to built the infrastructure
necessary to run the cable system in the public domain right-of-ways.
I) THE INITIAL FRANCHISE.
A) The Cable Act Of 1984.
The Cable Act of 1984 gave local governments the power to require "cable
systems" to obtain a franchise in order to operate in their communities. The
franchising process is a way for the local authority to regulate the operator.
However, the Act did not specify the franchising process or the specific
requirements imposed by franchise agreements. This gap led to significant
litigation between local governments and cable operators. Local governments
sought to preserve their ability to impose conditions on the franchisees while
cable operators were arguing that those requirements were an unconstitutional
restriction of their freedom of speech. The resulting local government's ability
to impose conditions for the franchise depends on the level of the First
Amendment protection that courts recognize is due to cable operators.
B) Cable Operators' Freedom Of Speech.
Under a traditional position of the Supreme Court, each medium of
expression must be evaluated under the First Amendment by the standard
suited to that medium. 263 In Leathers v. Medlock, 264 the Supreme Court held
that " cable television ... is engaged in speech under the first amendment, and
is, in much of its operations, part of the "press."
263 Southeastern Promotion, Ltd. V. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
264 499 U.S.C. 439, 444 (1991).
In Turner v. FCC, 265 the Supreme Court ruled that the intermediate standard
of review of O'Brien/Ward standard applied to most (if not all) first amendment
challenges to cable regulation. 266
The O'Brien/Ward test provides that:
"Government regulation is sufficiently justified if (1) it is in the
constitutional power of the government, (2) it further an important
or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and (3) the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedom is no greater than essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Although this test is the standard, courts have reached contradictory
results in the franchising process.
C) Overbuilt Issues.
Even if courts follow the same test in evaluating the constitutionality of
franchise requirements, the results are very different from one court to
another. In Preferred Communication , Inc. V. City ofLos Angeles, the court
found that because the medium of cable television is between the broadcast
and the print media on the governmental regulation continuum, but closer to
the print media, the City's limit of one cable operator per franchise area
violated the first amendment. 267 The court found that the restriction to one
operator per area was too restrictive for the interest of protecting streets from
disruption. On appeal, the US Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit found that
a city had the right to limit the number of entrant as long as the number was
greater than one. 268
265 Turner Broadcasting sys., Inc. v. FCC, 1 17 S. Ct. 1 174 (1997)).
266 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) as modified by Ward v. Rock against racism 491
U.S. 781 (1989).
267 No. CV 83-5846 (CBM), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20205, at 22 (CD. Cal. Jan. 5, 1990).
268
Preferred Communication, Inc v. City ofLos Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327 (9Th circuit).
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In Pacific W. Cable Co., v. City of Scramento, the court held that the
exclusive franchising scheme violated the first amendment since government
interest was not sufficient to satisfy the O'Brien test. 269
Other courts have decided differently. In Communication Systems., Inc. V.
City ofDanville, the court held that a city may reject an application for a
competing franchise on the ground that the market would not support two
cable operators. 270 Section 7 of the 1992 Act clarified the situation, 271
prohibiting franchising authority to grant an exclusive franchise and to
unreasonably refuse the award of an additional competitive franchise. In Cox
v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit held that
this provision was retroactive. 272
II) FRANCHISE RENEWAL.
Section 626 of the Cable Act of 1984 organizes the license renewal
procedure. 273 Although renewal is not automatic, most licenses will be renewed
without passing through the procedure. The Act allows the franchising
authority and the licensee to avoid the formal procedure, if they agree on the
conditions and terms of the new franchise. The procedure starts when the
licensee formally requests it. The franchising authority must then start the
proceeding within 6 months (Act of 1992).
269 672 F.Supp. 1322, 1339 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
270 880 F.2d 887-892 (6th Cir. 1989).
271 Cable Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. Section 541(a)(1).
272 Cox Cable Communication. Inc. v. United States, 992 F.d. 1 178 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
273 47 U.S.C. Section 546.
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In the first part of the proceeding, the franchising authority identifies the
needs of the served community and analyses the past performance of the
licensee. At this point, the licensee may, voluntary or under request of the
authority, submit a proposal for renewal. 274 In the second stage the authority
reviews the proposal and must accept or deny preliminarily the renewal within
four months. If the proposal is preliminary denied, the Commission would
analyze the decision against the standards given in the Act. The Commission
will review the licensee's compliance with the term of its license, the
reasonableness of the service quality, the financial, legal and technical
conditions of the licensee against the pre-requisites. Based on this it will
determine whether the proposal meets the community's needs. 275 The Act
prescribes that renewal will be refused under the first two prongs only if the
operator was ordered by the authority to change.
SECTION II: RATE REGULATION.
The Cable act of 1984 imposed no rate regulation for cable services. As a
result, rates for cable services rose significantly between 1984 and 1992. In the
1992 Act, Congress wanted to prevent cable operators from profiting from their
market power to charge excessive prices. The Commission had to establish rate
regulation for cable services that were not exposed to effective competition.
The Telecommunication Act of 1996 introduced competition in the video
distribution markets and organized a progressive deregulation of cable rates.
Cable operators' prices are regulated differently depending on the nature of
their operations.
274 /J Section 546 (b)(1).
275 /J Section 546(c)(1).
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There are three types of cable service for the purpose of rate regulation:
basic service, cable programming service, and per-channel or per-program (or
pay-per-view) service.
I) Basic Tier Cable Programming.
Basic service is the lowest level of cable service a subscriber can buy. It
includes, at a minimum, all over-the-air television broadcast signals carried
pursuant to the must-carry requirements of the Communications Act, and any
public, educational, or government access channels required by the system's
franchise agreement (PEG). The local franchising authority generally regulates
basic service. Rates in this tier are regulated by the local public utility
commission (PUC) following FCC guidelines. However, prior to the exercise of
this authority, the Commission must certify a franchising authority. The Act of
1992 mandated the local commission to ensure that the cable operators in this
tier charge reasonable rates. 276
II) Cable Programming Services.
Cable programming service includes all program channels on the cable
system that are not included in basic service, but are not separately offered as
per-channel or per-program services. The Telecommunication Act provides
that the Commission is responsible for regulating cable programming services
tiers until March 31, 1999.
After this date, this tier will be free from rate regulation. Until then, the FCC
has to ensure that the cable operator not facing "effective competition" charges
" reasonable prices".
276
Evolution of Cable Television, supra note 237.
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There are four separate tests to establish that effective competition exists:
(1) The households subscribing to a cable system constitute fewer
than 30 percent of the households in its franchise area; or
(2) There are at least two unaffiliated multi-channel video
programming distributors offering comparable video programming
to at least 50 percent of the households in the franchise area, and
the households subscribing to all but the largest multi-channel
video programming distributor exceed 15 percent of the
households in the franchise area; or
(3) The franchising authority is itself a multi-channel video
programming distributor offering services to at least 50 percent of
the households in the franchise area; or
(4) a local exchange carrier or its affiliate offers video
programming services directly to subscribers by any means in the
franchise area. 277
Ill) Per-Channel, Per-Program Services.
This category includes those cable services that are provided as single-
channel tiers by the cable operator, and individual programs for which the
cable operator charges a separate rate. Neither of these services is regulated by
the local franchising authorities or the Commission. Rates for channels sold on
a per-channel or per-program basis are not regulated. 278
277
Id
m Id
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SECTION III: REGULATION OF CONTENT.
I) THE "MUST-CARRY" RULE.
A) The Rule.
The "must carry-rule" traditionally allows certain local, low power or
educational television station broadcasters to have their signal transmitted by
cable systems. The Act of 1992 allowed broadcasters every three years to
choose between mandatory carriage under the traditional rule or payment for
retransmission rights. 279 The FCC has to ensure that payments for rights,
when chosen are reasonable. The commercial must-carry provisions require
cable systems carrying more than twelve channels to allocate one third of
usable activated channels for must carry purposes. When a cable operator
carries less than twelve channels, at least three of them must be dedicated to
the fulfillment of the must carry provisions. Finally, if a cable operator has less
than 300 subscribers, it has no must carry obligation. Concerning the non-
commercial channel, a cable operator with more than 36 channels will be
required to carry three non-commercial stations. When the cable operator
carries from 12 to 36 channels, only one channel will have to be carried.
B) Constitutionality of The Rule.
Some cable operators, like Turner Broadcasting, Inc., challenged the
constitutionality of the "must-carry rule". They argued that this rule was
forcing them to allocate channels and transmit programs that they otherwise
might not have chosen, imposing an impermissible burden on their First
Amendment rights.
Cable Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. Sections 4 & 5.
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However, the Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the "must carry
provisions."280 The court found that the O'Brien/Ward standard applied
because the provisions were essentially content-neutral economic regulation. 281
The Supreme Court found that genuine issues of material facts were missing
for the application of the test, and remanded the case to the District Court for
further proceedings. 282 On December 12, 1995, the District Court found that
the must-carry rules passed the test and were constitutional. 283 In March
1997, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court ruling. 284 The Supreme
Court found that the "must-carry" provisions further three governmental
interests: the benefit of free, over the air local broadcast television; the
promotion of widespread dissemination of information from multiple sources
and the promotion of fair competition in the market for television programming.
Concerning the "proportionality" requirement of the test, the Court found that
the rules were sufficiently narrow-tailored since cable operators generally fulfill
these obligations through unused channel capacity.
II) RETRANSMISSION CONSENT RULE.
This rule prohibits cable operators and other multi-channel video
programming distributors from re-transmitting the signal of a commercial
television station, or radio station without the prior consent of the station. The
rule was considered constitutional in Time Entertainment Co., L.P. v. FCC. 285
280 Turner Broadcasting sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F.Supp 32 (D.C.C. 1993).
281 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) as modified by Ward v. Rock against racism 491
U.S. 781 (1989). The test provides that government regulation is sufficiently justified if (1) it is in the
constitutional power of the government, (2) it further an important or substantial government interest
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (3) the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedom is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest.
282 Turner Broadcasting sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F.Supp 32 (D.C.C. 1993), vacated, 1 14. S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
283 Turner Broadcasting sys., Inc. v. FCC, 910 F.Supp 734 (D.C.C. 1995)
284 Turner Broadcasting sys., Inc. v. FCC, 1 17 S. Ct. 1 174 (1997)).
285 93 F.3d, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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III) REGULATION OF PROGRAMMING CONTENT.
Although the Cable Act of 1984 eliminated local government' s power to
regulate rates as well as the power to regulate the content of programs offered,
the Act provided exceptions. Section 625(d) of the Act provides that cable
operators are free from content regulation only when they are not subject to
rate regulation. On August 27, 1993, the Commission implemented the Act of
1992 and ruled that Section 625(d) no longer applied. Moreover, Section 624 of
the Act prohibits franchising authorities from establishing content requirement
for video programming. 286
SECTION IV : CABLE INSIDE WIRING RULES.
Regulation of cable inside wiring is very important for a successful
introduction of competition in the telecommunication industry. The home
wiring rules are intended to encourage competition between multi-channel
video delivery services. The rules allow a consumer who voluntarily terminates
cable service to use the wiring to receive a competing multi-channel video
delivery service without the expense and inconvenience of installing new wire.
I) Individual Cable Subscribers.
The 1992 Act directed the Commission to establish regulation for the
disposition of home wiring. On April 1, 1993, the Commission adopted the
Cable Home wiring Report and Order. 287 The Commission had to balance the
conflicting objectives of avoiding multiple home wiring installed by competitors
and encouraging competition from other providers with the incumbent.
286 Cable Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. Section 544 (b)(2)(B).
7
In re Implementation of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Cable Home
Wiring, Report and Order, 8 FCC Red. 1435 (1993).
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The Commission defined cable home wiring as "the internal wiring
contained within the premise of a subscriber that begins at the demarcation
point". The FCC rules govern the "disposition, after a subscriber voluntarily
terminates cable service, of that cable home wiring installed by the cable
system operator or its contractor within the premise of the subscriber." The
rules give a customer the ability to purchase inside wiring when the Cable
operator proposes to remove it. 288 On January 26, 1996, the Commission
released a First Order that modified the rules on home wiring. When a
subscriber advises the operator that he or she intend to terminate the service,
the operator must inform the subscriber that he owns the wiring and intends to
remove it. The cable operator must also inform the subscriber about his right
to purchase the home wiring and communicate the price. If the operator does
not comply with this procedure, the ownership of the wires passes to the
subscriber. If the operator fails to remove the wires after notice that the
subscriber will not buy it, the ownership also passes to the subscriber. When
the subscriber owns the wires, he may allow a competing service provider to
connect with and use the wire. 289
II) Multiple Dwelling Unit (MDU).
The Commission also sought comment on whether cable home wiring rules
should apply to the "loop through." The term "loop through" refers to a
configuration where all subscribers in a particular system elect to switch to an
alternative multi channel video programming service provider. 290
288 47 C.F.R. Section 76.5 (11).
289
In Re Implementation of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Cable Home
Wiring, 1 1 FCC Red. 4561 (1996).
290
Id.
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In 1997, the Commission adopted a Report and Order on cable inside
wiring, implementing section 16(d) of the 1992 Cable Act. The new rules allow
subscribers to have parallel cable built at any time. When the Multi-channel
Video Programming distributor is terminated by the MDU owner and has no
enforceable rights to maintain its wiring on the premise, he must sell, remove
or abandon the home run wiring according to two different procedures. The
first procedure is the building-by-building procedure where the operator has
the option to choose between sale removal and abandonment. This procedure
applies when a single loop serves all the subscribers of the MDU ("loop
through").
In the other procedure, the unit-by-unit procedures, the MDU owner may
allow different providers to compete for the right to use the individual home
run wires. In such a case, the incumbent has to exercise its option for all
individual users who want to use a competitive provider. When the incumbent
chooses to sell, the price must be negotiated. If the negotiation fails, the
incumbent can decide for a binding arbitration. In the sale process, the FCC
gave the owner of the MDU an option to own the home run wiring in the
building. Only when the option is not exercised may a competitive provider
purchase the wiring.. 291
291 47 U.S.C. Section 626 (c)(1)(B).
109
PART II: REGULATION OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING UNDER
THE NEW OPEN VIDEO SYSTEM
The telecommunication Act created a fourth regulatory regime for video
programming. This regime, "open video system," was designed for the provision
of video programming by local exchange carriers and cable operators. The
provision embodies Congress' attempt to make Local Exchange Carriers and
Cable Operators compete in the market for Video programming. Under this
regime, providers of video programming can avoid the rules on compulsory
access of Title II and the regulation applicable to cable systems. On March 1 1,
1996, the Commission issued the First Report and Order implementing the
Act's provisions concerning video programming. 292 The Commission eliminated
the video dialtone rule and the rule of section 214 prohibiting telephone
companies from delivering video programming.
I) WHO CAN OPERATE AN OPEN VIDEO SYSTEM?
New section 653(a)(1) of the Cable Act allows Local Exchange Carriers to
operate Open Video System outside their telephone service area when the
public interest, convenience and necessity are served. 293 The Commission
interpreted the new Section 653 (a)(1) of the Cable Act as allowing LECs and
non-LECs not in their telephone service areas to operate OVS when the public
interest and necessity are served. 294
292
In Re Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecommunication Act of 1996; open Video System.
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed rule making, 1 1 FCC Red. 14639. (first First Report and
Order).
' Telecommunication Act, Section 653 (a)(1) , "A local exchange carrier may provide cable service to its
cable service subscribers in its telephone service area through an open video system that complies with this
section".
294
In Re Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecommunication Act of 1996; open Video System.
Second report and Order, CS Dkt. No. 96-46), FCC 96- 249, 1996 WL 290812 (released June 3, 1996), at
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A cable operator could convert his cable system into an Open Video System
if it in the public interest or if the cable operator is subject to effective
competition in this area. The Commission ruled the cable operators could
convert their cable system to an OVS, even if they provide local exchange
services in their areas (discrimination of LECs) if they face effective competition
and the shift would serve the public interest. 295 The Third Report and Order
introduced two exceptions. A competing in-region cable operator may operate
an OVS if the competing OVS operator establishes that it would be in its
interest or if the shift does not significantly impede facility-based
competition. 296 Finally, the Act allows any person that fulfills the conditions to
provide video programming through open video programming. 297
II) REDUCED REGULATORY BURDEN OF OVS OPERATORS
In the First Report and Order, the Commission adopted a streamlined
regulatory structure where Open Video System Operators are treated "no
better, no worse than a cable operator."298
12.
295 Id at 25.
296
In Re Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecommunication Act of 1996; open Video System. Third
Report and Order, (CS Dkt. No. 96-46), FCC 96- 334, 1996 WL 457194 (released Aug. 8, 1996), at 17
"To the extent permitted by such regulations as the Commission may prescribe consistent with the
public interest, convenience, and necessity, an operator of a cable system or any other person may provide
video programming through an open video system that complies with this section." Id.
298
In Re Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecommunication Act of 1996; open Video System.
Second report and Order, CS Dkt. No. 96-46), FCC 96- 249, 1996 WL 290812 (released June 3, 1996), at
12.
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A) Certification Procedure.
1) No franchise Requirement.
Under the 1996 Act, telecommunication carriers that provide video
programming to their subscribers through the open video system have to be
certified by the Commission. 2" This provision was introduced to avoid the
consent of the local franchise authorities. The Commission implemented a
streamlined certification procedure whereby an OVS operator is not required to
obtain the consent of local franchise authorities prior to certification. However,
the certification must be obtained before the OVS starts operating or building a
plant.
2) State and Local Authorities.
Although the Act exempt the OVS operator from the franchise requirements
(Title VI franchise), they can still be imposed "non discriminatory and
competitively neutral condition or requirements that are necessary to manage
the public right of way."300
B) "OVS" Operators Subject To Cable Content Regulation.
In the Second Report and Order, the Commission ruled that OVS operators
are subject to the must carry rule and the retransmission content rule with few
exceptions. In the Third Report and order, the Commission determined that the
OVS operators don't have to duplicate the must-carry programming already
provided. 301
29q Telecommunication Act, Section 651 (A) (3) (b))..
300 Id at 212.
301 See In Re Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecommunication Act of 1996; open Video System.
Third Report and Order, (CS Dkt. No. 96-46), FCC 96- 334, 1996 WL 457194 (released Aug. 8, 1996), at
156.
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OVS operators are also subject to the public, educational, or government
(PEG) access requirement for every franchise area that their system overlap.
They have to provide PEG access to every OVS subscriber. The commission
instituted a two step procedure to implement the requirements. In the first
step, the operator has to negotiate with the local authority. If no agreement is
reached, the commission provides a default rule whereby the operator must
"satisfy the same PEG access obligation as the local cable operator. 302 In the
Third Report and Order, the Commission applied the "matching principle to
PEG requirement. 303 According to that rule, the OVS operator must match the
annual PEG access financial contribution of the local cable operator. 304 When
there is no cable operator in the concerned area, the PEG access requirement
will be negotiated. If no agreement is reached, the commission mandates the
authorities to find a reasonable agreement.
C) Allocation of Channel Capacity.
In Section 653(b)(1), the Act requires the Commission to implement a series
of detailed rules on the allocation of OVS channel capacity. The Commission, in
the Second Report and Order simply adopted the rules that were suggested in
the Telecommunication Act. 305 OVS operators are prohibited from
discriminating among video programming with regard to carriage on its open
video system.
302 Id at 137.
303 Id
304
Id at 130.
305
In Re Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecommunication Act of 1996; open Video System.
Second report and Order, CS Dkt. No. 96-46), FCC 96- 249, 1996 WL 290812 (released June 3, 1996), at
12.
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The Commission has to ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions for
such carriage are just and reasonable, and are not unjustly or unreasonably
discriminatory. 306 If demand exceeds the channel capacity of their open video
system, operators cannot select the video programming services for more than
one-third of the activated channel capacity. 307 However, operators are not
limited in the number of channels that he may offer directly to subscribers, nor
are they required to offer more than one channel. Finally, OVS operators are
prohibited from unreasonable discrimination in its or an affiliate favor for the
selection or presentation of material or information (including advertising). 308
306 Telecommunication Act of 1996, Section 653 (b)(1)(A).
307
Id Section 653 (b)( 1 )(B) & (C ).
308 Id Section 653 (b)(l)(E)(I)
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PART III: THE CASE OF CABLE-PROVIDED INTERNET
SERVICES.
The cable industry is in the middle of a transformation from a system that
provides one-way delivery of analog television signals to a two-way interactive
broadband network based on IP technology. Many cable operators are currently
deploying fiber optic fiber lines necessary for two-way interactivity, along the
traditional coaxial line. This will allow them to deliver a wide range of
telecommunications and information services including Internet access,
competitive access for business to connect to long distance companies, local
residential voice service, and digital television. 309 However, the new
telecommunication legislation does not provide adapted regulation for these
new services provided by cable operators. On the one hand, Internet over cable
can be classified as Information services, creating a dual regulatory regime for
cable operators. On the other hand, it can be classified as cable service, and
regulated as such. The problem of this second solution is that part of the
regulation applicable to cable services is not adapted to Internet services.
1. Modern Cable Architecture
Modern cable architecture contain a headend that processes programming
operations and functions. From there, trunk lines (high-capacity fiber or
coaxial cables) carry signals to smaller trunks serving local neighborhoods
nodes. From there feeder lines connect to subscriber's premises. Modern
networks takes fiber from the headend all the way to feeder lines, increasing
network reliability and interoperability, which are essential to two-way services.
(Hibrid Fiber and Coaxial architectures). 310
09 See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Hall R. Varian, supra note 171.
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In order to provide Internet access, modulators and computer servers are
located at the cable system headend, where the cable system interconnects
with the Internet through "Regional hubs" that interconnect with other
telecommunications networks. The hybrid fiber and coaxial nature of the
network allows both upstream and downstream Internet access. A cable
modem connects the cable television coaxial wiring and to the user's computer
via a standard Ethernet connection. 3n
Modern cable systems can carry data up to 1000 times faster than
transmission using dial-up modems over ordinary copper twisted-pair phone
lines. 312
However, the "bus" architecture of cable system is not well adapted to two-
way interactive data services: "return path transmission interference problem."
One solution is to use cable architecture for transmitting downstream data
transmissions, and telephone lines for the upstream or "return" path, which
requires far less capacity. 313
2. Current Cable offering Internet Services or "Cable Modem
Service."
Cable operators intend to offer Internet Services that will be closer in nature
to traditional cable offerings, with significant operator-provided content and
browsing capability. They want to provide an improved version of the services
offered by the telephone carriers. 314 Here are tow examples of commercial
ventures that will soon offer cable Internet services.
311 See Barbara Esbin, supra note 170.
312 See Company profile, road Runner web site, < http://www.rr.com/rdrun/company/index.html>
313 See Barbara Esbin, supra note 170.
116
The @Home Network is a joint venture of several cable operators such as
Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI), Comcast Corp., Cox Communications, Inc, ...
etc. 315 ". The combined cable networks of @Home's partners reach
approximately 40 percent of U.S. households alone. 316
The @Home service includes Internet service through "always on"
connection, and multimedia programming through "an intuitive graphical user
interface."317 The content is provided by the Company's @Media group. 318
"@Work," business version of the service is a high-speed, fully managed data
services that offers businesses "end-to-end managed connectivity for Internet,
Intranet and extranet solutions. 319
RoadRunner is another broadband online high-speed service over cable
developed by the Excalibur Group. It is a joint venture between Time Warner
Cable, MediaOne Group, Inc., Microsoft Corp., and Compaq Corp., with the
collaboration of CNN and Warner Bros. It provides high speed connection to a
wide range of resources such as newspapers, libraries, entertainment and
information services, and access to the Internet through Time Warner's "mega-
site," Pathfinder. 320 . By the year 2000, the company plan to have its services
available to all of the 27 million homes passed by Time Warner and MediaOne
as well as those homes passed by additional affiliated cable companies. 321
315
Press release of October 1998, (a\Home Network Surpasses 10 Million Upgraded Homes Passed Mark,
at<http://www.home.net/corp/news/releases.html>
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3. Regulation of Internet Cable Services Under the 1996 Act.
Cable Internet-based services may fall within two different categories: "cable
services" or "information service" offerings. This classification has important
consequences. Cable services are regulated under "(section 602(6)), regulated
under Title VI of the Communication Act322 while information services remain
unregulated. Regulating Cable Internet services as cable services would create
a different Internet regulation depending on the identity of the provider. On the
other hand, cable regulation was created when cable operator provided TV-like
services. Therefore, it is not suited for interactive services.
# "Parallel Universes" for Cable and Telephony Internet-
Based Services.
The Commission could reasonably conclude that Internet access services,
such as @Home and RoadRunner, when provided by a cable operator over its
cable system, come within the revised definition of "cable services." Internet-
based services share many of the features of traditional cable programming
services.
"Cable service" is currently defined as:
"the one-way transmission to subscribers of video programming or other programming
service, and subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or use of
such video programming or other programming service." 323
The only change the 1996 Act made to the statutory definition of cable
services was the inclusion of the words "or use" before "of such video
programming or other programming service." The legislative history shows that
this addition was intended to cover the interactive nature of interactive
computer, enhanced and information services and Internet access services. 324
322 Communication Act of 1934, ch. Section 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
Section 151 (1988). Or, 47 U.S.C.s 151 (1934) (Current version at 47 U.S.C.s 151 (1994).
323 Cable Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C, Section 602(6).
324 See Barbara Esbin, supra note 1 70.
To be considered cable services, Internet services provided by cable
operators must involve the "selection" or "use" of video programming or other
programming services. When user access the Internet through cable system, a
messages is sent to the Internet server at the cable headend (upstream),
indicating which site on the Internet she wishes to visit, and the information
she wishes to receive or download. It can be argued that this constitute the
subscriber's "selection" and "use" of programming under the new definition of
cable service. Additionally, the definition describes cable services as one way
transmission of programming services. This prong of the definition is satisfied
because once the user has sent her message, the operator's only act is to sent
the requested content.
Finally, to be considered cable services, Internet services offered through
cable facilities must constitute video programming or other programming
services. "Video programming" is defined as "programming provided by, or
generally considered comparable to programming provided by, a television
broadcast station." 325 .Whether cable Internet-based services constitute video
programming will depend largely upon what content is provided over the
Internet and how that content is provided. A basic Internet connection
allowing a subscriber to visit Web sites put up by third parties may not be
comparable to programming provided by a television broadcast station. On the
other hand, live video images transmitted across the Internet is much closer to
traditional broadcasting.
"Other programming service" mean "information that a cable operator
makes available to all subscribers generally". 326
325 Telecommunication Act of 1996, Section 602(20)
"'Telecommunication Act of 1996, Section 602(14)
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The transmission and downloading of computer software or video games or
statistical packages was cited as an example of a cable communications service
that would fit under the "other programming services" prong of the definition.
327 Cable Internet-based services that are made available to all subscribers
generally and that do not include information that is "subscriber specific" may
well be considered cable services under this prong of the definition.
# Classifying Cable Internet-Based Services as Information
Services.
Information services is defined as
"the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing,
but does not include any use of any such capability for the management,
control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the
management of a telecommunications service." 328 -
Cable Internet-based services offering nothing more than basic conduit
access to the Internet are closer to Information services, and cable operators
offering such access services could be considered "Internet access providers."
Under this interpretation, cable Internet access services would be treated as a
"information" services, subject only to the Commission's ancillary jurisdiction
over "wire communications" under Title I of the Act. 329
# Difficult Classification: IP Telephony Over Cable.
Comcast has recently announced that CableLabs (the research lab for the
cable industry) is developing a specialized form of IP telephony tailored for
cable systems, that would enable telephone customers to by-pass LEC and
even IXC telephone networks entirely. 330
327 Cable Act of 1 984, Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1 064 (Codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. Section 1 5 1 - 6 1 3 ( 1 994)).
"'Telecommunication Act of 1996, Section (3)(a)(48).
329 Communication Act of 1934, ch. Section 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
Section 151 (1988). Or, 47 U.S.C.s 151 (1934) (Current version at 47 U.S.C.s 151 (1994).
330 See Information on Comcast web site: <www.comcast.com>
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Cable-based IP telephony differs from the forms of Internet telephony
already in use. Instead of using the public Internet itself as the "carrier" for a
telephone call, cable-based IP telephony uses IP addressing only, but carries
the call over what is described only as an "engineered network." 331 As we have
seen in a previous chapter, Internet telephony over telecommunication carriers'
networks poses regulatory problems due to its hybrid nature between POTS
(plain Old Telephone Service) and Information service. In the case of IP
telephony over cable network, one level of complexity in regulatory treatment is
added as it can be classified as telecommunication service, information service,
and cable service. Marketing strategies of cable operators make the issue even
more confusing since the service would not be marketed as 'IP telephony," but
simply as a cheaper alternative to regular telephone service. 332
4. Consequences of the Classification.
Cable industry representatives argue that Internet-based services provided
over cable systems should be considered as cable services (under Title VI), in
order to bring regulatory stability. However, this raises difficult definitional,
jurisdictional and policy concerns. Cable operators would be permitted to
provide advanced cable services free of interconnection and unbundling
requirements. Telecommunications carriers would be obliged to offer network
interconnection, unbundled network elements, and controlled rates to
competing enhanced and information service providers. Another problem of
such interpretation is that rules governing cable operators were not written for
two-way interactive services like Internet access, but for video programming
similar to broadcast television, and are therefore completely unadapted.
331 See Barbara Esbin, supra note 170.
332 See id.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MODERN REGULATION OF THE SPECTRUM.
INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT OF WIRELESS
TELECOMMUNICATION
I) History of Radio Communication.
a) The Development of Radio Communication.
Radio communication started with the invention of wireless telegraph in
1895. The company that Guglielmo Marconi formed to exploit his invention
was selling equipment for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore Morse
communication. 333 The following years, three fundamental technologies of
modern radio communication were discovered; the Audion three element
vacuum tubes, the voice modulator and the "feedback circuit."334 When the
company that exploited the Audion Patent went bankrupt, AT&T bought the
patent. 335 Later Marconi was successful in claiming that part of the patent
violated his exclusive rights on the wireless telegraphy technology. As a result,
both companies owned the patent. Fessender National Electric Signaling
Company also went bankrupt, and the patent for voice modulator was sold to
General Electric. 336 Finally, Amstrong was granted a patent for the "feedback
circuit."337
333 See Gleason L. Archer, History ofRadio to 1926, (1938) at 58.
334 See Id at 26.
335 See Id at 106-109.
336 See Wat 86-88 and 115-118.
337 See Wat 113-114.
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Although these three technologies were necessary for the manufacture of
radio communication equipment, no agreement among the four parties was
reached. When The United States entered World War I, the Navy confiscated
the patents for the radio communication technology and contracted with
General Electric and Westinghouse to produce army's needs in radio
communication equipment. 338 At the end of the War, the Navy started urging
the government to take over the regulation of the spectrum. In 1919, the Radio
Corporation of America (RCA) was created to replace Marconi (Whose British
nationality posed securities issues). 339 Later, the companies holding the other
necessary patents for the manufacture of radio equipment decided to cooperate
through the "RCA Alliance." Under the agreement, RCA was to sell receivers
under its brand that General Electric and Westinghouse would produce. 340
AT&T had exclusivity to sell the transmitters produced by its subsidiary
Western Electric. The alliance included Westinghouse because of its
acquisition of the Amstrong patent.
b) The Origin of Spectrum Regulation.
When Hoover was appointed as Secretary of Commerce in 1921, he was
given the responsibility to implement the Radio act of 1910. 341 Following the
Navy's requests, he started to regulate radio communication through
administrative licensing of the spectrum. That year, the Department of
Commerce issued five licenses. In 1922, 453 additional licenses were granted.
But the expansion stopped there.
338 See Id at 137-140.
339 See Id at 172-180.
340 See Id at 194-195.
341 Ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302.
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One year later in Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co.
,
342 the court held that the
Secretary of Commerce had no power to refuse a license or to impose
restrictions for the frequency, power and hours of operation of a licensee. It
meant that anybody could use the spectrum. Since amateurs could build radio
equipment bypassing the products of the "RCA alliance," the period following
the decision was a situation of chaos, as more than 200 new stations began
operating. 343 Communication throughout the spectrum became impossible
because of the number of operators. This was the main reason for Congress to
pass the Radio Act of 1927, 344 establishing a system of administrative licensing
for the right to operate at specific frequencies in the spectrum. The Radio
Commission was in charge of the spectrum management. 345 At this time, AT&T
and The Radio Corporation of America had both control over the electronic
amplifier. Instead of competing, they negotiated a "gentleman agreement"
whereby RCA an AT&T would stay in their own market; respectively
broadcasting and telephony. 346 This agreement stopped the development of
wireless telecommunication for years
The Radio Act of 1927 helped the two companies in this market repartition.
The Act prohibited cross-ownership of telephone and broadcasting companies,
and exempted broadcasters from common carriers regulation. 347 The
Communication Act of 1934348 transferred the powers of the Radio Commission
to the Federal Communication Commission. The Act was also trying to attack
one of the monopolies; National Broadcasting Company.
342 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
343 See Generally Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of The Digitally
Networked Environment, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 1 1, No. 2, Winter 1998.
344 Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1064.
345 See Yochai Benkler, supra note 338 at 299.
346 See Jim Chen, Supra Note 19, at 840.
347 Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1 162, amended by Ch, 788,46 Stat- 844 (1930), repealed by the Communication Act
of 1934, Ch. 652, Section 602,48 Stat. 1064, 1 102.
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In 1942, the FCC and the federal antitrust division of the Department of
Justice forced RCA to split its interests between ABC and a newly created
company; NBC. On the other side, AT&T remained an unregulated monopoly
and could develop wireless telephony at its own speed. Several years later,
AT&T developed the initial mobile communication system with one tower
broadcasting. However, the system had limited capacity because each channel
could carry only one conversation throughout the city.
II) Creation of Cellular Telephony and Administrative
Licensing.
In the 1960's and 70's, AT&T, Western Electric and the Bell Laboratories
developed the cellular technology to provide wireless access services in the 400
and 800 MHz range. 349 The name cellular comes from the division of the
territory where the communication is implemented in "cells' of different sizes.
The idea is that the capacity of transmission in each cell is limited so that the
frequencies can be reused and capacity can be increased.
a) The technology.
The territory where cellular communication is intended is divided into cells,
each containing a base station. When the user sends a message, it is
transmitted to the closest base station. From there, the signal is sent to the
station closest to the receiver. In this way, the distance over which emitter and
receiver must communicate is shortened, and the power at which they need to
operate is reduced.
148 Ch 652, 48 Stat, 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. Section 151.613 (1994)).
349
Brian J. W. Regli: Wireless, Strategically Liberalizing the Telecommunication Market, Lawrence
Erlbram Associate, Inc., 1997, p 123.
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When the spectrum is used with low power of operation, it may
accommodate a lot more transmissions. 350
b) Administrative Allocation of the Spectrum.
In 1974, the FCC made a first proposal to allocate 40 MHz of the spectrum
to one cellular operator (AT&T) in each defined geographic market. 351 The FCC
believed that only established wire-line carriers had the technical and financial
expertise to operate this system. 352 This policy was also based on the belief
that the telephone industry was a "natural monopoly due to the strong
economies of scale and network externalities.
However, in 1982, the FCC decided to introduce controlled competition by
licensing two operators within each defined area. 353 In each franchise area the
Commission allocated a range of 20 MHz of spectrum to wire-line local
telephone companies provided that they form a fully separate subsidiary to
exploit the technology. An additional 20 MHz of spectrum was allocated to non
wire-line operators. To encourage competition, the FCC started comparative
hearings to determine the non-wireline carrier in each market.
However, as the process was difficult and time consuming, the FCC decided
to hold lotteries. The process resulted in a fractionalized ownership. With a
favorable decision of the FCC, a race for aggregation started. One the one hand,
telephone companies acquire a half of the non-wireline licenses and aggregated
3/4^ of the entire coverage. On the other hand, McCaw Cellular
Communication achieved to cover 25% of the population.
350 See Y. Benkler, supra note 348, at 398.
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353 See Id at 315.
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Despite the shift from analog to digital, cellular technology cannot
accommodate the enormous future estimated demand for wireless
communication. Furthermore, the technology suffers from a limited bandwidth
(the spectrum for cellular communication is scarce) and a high cost of business
per subscriber (prices for cellular communication are high). Despite the shift
from analog to digital, cellular technology cannot accommodate the enormous
future estimated demand for wireless communication. Furthermore the
technology suffers from a limited bandwidth (the spectrum for cellular
communication is scarce) and a high cost of business per subscriber (prices for
cellular communication are high).
Ill) Technological Development, deregulation, and the New
Direction of the wireless Industry.
A) Technological Development.
1) Frequency Division Multiple Access (FMDA).
The traditional analog cellular systems use Frequency Division Multiple
Access (FDMA). FDMA channels are defined by a range of radio frequencies
usually expressed in a number of kilohertz (kHz), out of the radio spectrum.
With FDMA, only one subscriber at a time is assigned to a channel. No other
conversations can access this channel until the subscriber's call is finished, or
until that original call is handed off to a different channel by the system.
2) Spread Spectrum and Code Division Multiple Access.
CDMA divide the radio spectrum available into "carriers" which are 1.25
MHz wide. Multiple users share the same "carriers". The signal sent is spread
over a much greater bandwidth than the original signal (Spread Spectrum)
.
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A CDMA call starts with a standard rate of 9.6 k/bits per second. This is
then spread to a transmitted rate of about 1.23 M/bits per second. These data
are transmitted along with the signals of all the other users in that cell. Digital
codes are applied to the data sent, shared by both the mobile station (cellular
phone) and the base station, to differentiate users. When the signal is received,
the codes are removed from the desired signal, separating the users and
returning the call to a rate of 9600 bps. The signal is encoded to sound like
noise to every receiver but the intended one that will have the code to render it
intelligible. 354 Consequently, multiple users can use the same frequency band
simultaneously. 355
3) Time Division Multiple Access (TMDA).
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access common multiple access method
employed in new digital cellular systems. TDMA systems commonly start with a
slice of spectrum referred to as one "carrier". Each carrier is then divided into
time slots. The message of each user is divided into digital packets that are
transmitted in short "bursts" occupying the entire channel for a brief. The
entire bandwidth of a particular frequency band is used to send multiple and
simultaneous signals. The packets of each user are sent in rapid short cycle to
reconstruct a natural conversation. 356
These technological developments make a more efficient use of the radio
spectrum, and allow wireless carriers to send any content; voice, data, images.
They have changed our traditional understanding of the spectrum
management. It is now possible to share the spectrum among multiple wireless
telecommunication players.
354 See the CMDA Development Group, http://www.cdg.org/
355 See Y. Benkler, supra note 348, at 394.
356 See Id at 397.
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IV) Different Spectrum Regulation Models.
Three successive alternatives have been implemented for the regulation of
radio communication. When free use of the spectrum proved impossible due to
interference problems, the Radio Act of 1927 created a system of administrative
licensing of broadcasters. Under this system, a licensee could operate in the
given frequency band under authorization and at the conditions set by the
government. Later, as new technologies such as PCS or LMDS expanded
potential use of spectrum, Ronald Coase recommended that the government
introduces a market based allocation of the spectrum. This process would
create a secondary market for licenses that would create the most efficient
allocation through market forces. 357 Following this evolution, Congress created
another model of radio regulation, the "market-based spectrum allocation."358
The 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act359 implemented this scheme by
authorizing the FCC to allocate of the spectrum through an auction
procedure360
,
creating a system of property rights in the radio frequency
bands. 361
The auction system was found the best legal solution to solve the problem of
spectrum interference.
Recently, as technological developments in the digital information
processing and wireless communication continue to expand the spectrum
resource, another regulatory model has emerged. I
357 Ronald Coase, The Federal Communication Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
358 See Y. Benkler, supra note 348, at 3 15,
359
Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
360 Communication Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(j).
361 See Y. Benkler, supra note 348, at 315.
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It consist in regulating wireless communication with the of minimum
governmental rules and the development of protocols ("common") through
private standard setting mechanisms. As Y. Benkler explains:
"Wireless transmission can be regulated by combination of (a)
baseline rules that allow users to coordinate their use, to avoid
interference-producing collisions, and to prevent, for the most
part, congestion, by conforming to equipment manufacturers'
specification, and (b) industry and government-sponsored
standards."362
See Id at 325.
130
PART ONE ; AUCTION PROCEDURE AND THE
CATEGORIZATION OF THE FCC.
Ronald Coase introduced the theory of market base allocation as an
alternate model to the administrative licensing process. 363 He recommended
that the government hold an auction for the initial allocation of licenses. This
would create a secondary market for licenses where market forces would be
engaged. The Congress and the Commission followed Coase's suggestion when
they introduced the auction system in 1993. 364 The idea behind this allocation
process is that the spectrum is a good that will be best allocated through
market forces. 365 Accordingly, the best legal solution found to solve the
problem of interference in the spectrum was to define a set of property rights in
the spectrum and let market transactions allocate it to its highest valued use.
On August 10, 1993, Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act366 and gave the FCC express authorization to employ competitive bidding to
choose among mutually exclusive applications for initial licenses. 367
Under the system created by the Act, the FCC determines what part of the
spectrum would be used for what kind of technology. Then, those parts are
allocated to the highest bidder. The initial licensing process establishes
categories and subcategories of spectrum.
363 Ronald Coase, supra note 323.
364 See Y. Benkler, supra note 348, at 315.
365 See Id at 3 17.
366
Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
367 47 U.S.C. Section 3090).
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According to Coase, it represents the introduction of goods on the
secondary market for licenses. 368 Since 1994, the FCC issued a series of orders
setting the rules for a service specific auction. 369 The Commission began
implementing the Act in the CMRS Second Report and Order released on
March 7, 1994. 37°
I) PERSONAL COMMUNICATION SERVICES.
PCS is an individualized telecommunications service permitting users to
communicate regardless of location. The low power, wireless communications
technology uses lightweight, inexpensive pocket telephones to provide high
quality digital phone that can be used outside, at home or in the office, and
personal computers to transmit voice, fax, and data from anywhere. It provides
PCS is a system similar to cellular, using smaller cells and higher frequencies,
so that the distance each signal has to travel is reduced.
A) The Technology.
Personal Communication Services (hereafter "PCS") is a digital wireless
communication technology that employs smaller cells and operates at higher
frequencies, where the spectrum is abundant. The FCC defines PCS as "radio
communication that encompasses mobile and ancillary fixed communication
that provide services to individuals and businesses, and can be integrated with
a variety of competing networks."371 This technology was allocated an
enormous portion of the spectrum and will provide substantial future benefits
in the competition.
368 See Y. Benkler, supra note 348, at 3 1 5.
369 See Id at 3 19.
70
Implementation of Section 3(n) and 332 of the Communication Act, Regulatory treatment of Mobile
Services, GN Docket No. 93-252, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Red 141 1 (1994).
371 47 C.F.R. Section 24.5.
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The only shadow is that the multiplicity of players and the huge needs for
capital will delay the full development of PCS and the replacement of the
cellular technology. However, 8 million customers are expected by 2000 and
37.5 million in 2006.
B) Auction Proceedings.
Allocation of the radio spectrum for PCS was made through Federal Action,
using the auction process authorized in 1993. 372 The Commission allocated 120
MHz of the spectrum, divided in six different blocks, 30Mhz for each of the
three first blocks (A. B. and C) and 10 MHz for each of the other. The
Commission started the allocation process in July 1994 by the Block A
licenses, 10 nationwide narrow band PCS licenses that will be used for
advanced paging and data services. 373 Real time telephony cannot be offered
through those licenses due to the limited bandwidth. $617 million were
collected for ten narrow-band PCS licenses. Most of the winners are well known
players in the telecommunication industry suchn as PageNet, Macaw,
BellSouth, ... etc. Also part of the block A, 30 regional narrow-band licenses (6
licenses in each of five regions) were auctioned in October and November 1994.
Most licenses were auctioned as nationwide aggregation.
The most important auction was block B auction, for broadband PCS.
Licenses will allow a full range of telecommunication services. Proceeding
began on December 5, 1994, with the auction of 99 MTA broadband PCS
licenses, two 30 MHz licenses in each of the 51 Major Trading Areas ("MTA").
(New York, Washington and Los Angeles had previously been awarded Pioneer's
preference Licenses).
372 See the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
3 See Donald L. Alexander, Telecommunications Policy, Have the regulators dial the wrong number?,
Praeger, 1997, p76.
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The second broadband PCS auction (Block C) started in December 1995.
Licenses were proposed in each of the 493 Basic Trading Area. This auction
was designated to fulfill the mandate of Congress to provide opportunities to
small businesses and businesses owned by minorities and women. The
auction procedure was delayed by a series of stays issued by U.S. Courts of
Appeal based on constitutional issues. 374 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and ruled that federal affirmative action programs included in the
FCC rules for standing in the auction proceeding must withstand a strict
judicial scrutiny375 . In order to avoid further delay in the auction, the FCC
issued the Sixth Report and Order for competitive bidding. 376 The order
modified the auction rules in order to neither make them race nor gender
specific. Nonetheless the auction was stayed another time by the Sixth Circuit.
Justice Stevens intervened to vacate the stay on the ground that the delay was
endangering the overall allocation process, giving licensees of the first two
blocks the advantage of entering the market first.
C) Auction Winners.
Three large telecommunication groups have gone to the MTA broadband
PCS auction with nationwide strategy. Wireless Co., L. P., which is a
consortium of Sprint and three large Cable TV companies (TCI, Comcast and
Cox), won one third of the licenses for PCS. Combining their assets will allow
them to offer long distance telephony, local exchange and video services.
76 See Lisa M. Warner, Wireless Technology Creating Competition in the Local Exchange Market: How
Will Local Exchange Carriers Compete'?, The Catholic University of America, ComLaw Conspectus,
Winter 1996.
377 Adarand Constructor, Inc v. Pena, 1 15 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
378
In Re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communication act of 1934- Competitive Bidding, Race
and Gender Based provision for Auctioning C Block Broadband Personal Communication Services
Licenses, Sixth Report and Order, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,786, (1995) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R Section 24,715).
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Another winner, PCS Primeco L. P., is a partnership of three Bell Operating
Companies (Bell Atlantic, Nynex and US West) and Air Touch, was awarded
many licenses. The partnership will offer wireless sendees throughout the
country. Finally, AT&T was awarded many licenses although it could only bid
for 52% of the MTA since it owns Macaw, the largest cellular firm after GTE.
With its recent merger with TCI, AT&T will be able to provide wireless local
services throughout the country, cable services, along the traditional long
distance business.
D) Amount of Spectrum one Entity May Own.
Witnessing the UK experience, showing a maximum of two competing PCS
operators, the FCC encouraged aggregation of licenses. Companies that
combine Broadband PCS, cellular Radio and specialized mobile radio licenses
may not own more that 45 MHz. Those having broadband PCS licenses alone
have a limit of 40 MHz.
II) LOCAL MULTI-POINT DISTRIBUTION SERVICES (LMDS).
LMDS uses over-the-air microwave facilities to provide a large array of
telecommunication services. LMDS licensees, with a broad bandwidth
allocated, will be able to develop the technology into a fungible service that may
be used for phone lines, high speed Internet line, and video lines. It is a cheap
way for companies that want access to the local loop. In January 1991, the
Commission granted CellularVision's application for a license to provide LMDS
in the 27.5-28.5 GHz frequency band, over the New York Primary Metropolitan
Statistical Area. 377 The license covered point-to-multi-point operation for video
distribution operations.
79
See Application of Hye Crest Management, Inc., for License Authorization in the Point-to-Point
Microwave Services in the 27.5-29.5 GHz Band and request for Waiver of the Rules, File No. 10380-CF-P-
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To grant this license, the Commission had to waive the application of
section 21-108 of its rules that reserved this band of the spectrum for point-to-
point communication only. Under this experimental commercial license
Cellular Vision USA currently offers high speed TV and Internet access in New
York through LMDS technology7 .
In 1993, based on this experience, the commission issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking considering the re-allocation of the 28 GHz band from
fixed point-to-point to fixed point-to-multi-point. 378 The proposed rulemaking
found widespread interest for both terrestrial and satellite point-to multi-point
use of the 28 GHz band of the spectrum. The Commission concluded that the
public interest would be served by allowing both terrestrial and fixed satellite
providers to operate on the band, and established the LMDS/FSS 28 GHz Band
Negotiated Rule Making Committee. In September 1994, the Committee issued
a report concluding that LMDS could only share the spectrum with Mobile
Satellite Services. In the First Report and Order379
,
the Commission assigned
the 28 GHz band (27.5-29.25 GHz ), to several types of wireless services. The
problem was that LMDS licensees were required to restrict their operations to
hub-to-hub subscriber transmission in the 29.1-29.25 GHz segment. In the
Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission proposed to designate
the 31 GHz band for LMDS use on a primary protected basis, in order to ensure
that there is adequate two way interactive capacity for the various proposed
LMDS services.
88, Memorundum Opinion and Order, 6, FCC Red 332 (1991).
80 Rule making to Amend Part 1 and Part 21 of the Commission's Rules to Redesignate 27.5-29.5 GHz
Frequency Band and to establish rules and policies for Local Multipoint Distribution services; RM-7872.
RM-7722, Application for Waiver of the Commission's Common Carrier Point-to-Point Microwave Radio
Service Rules; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Order, Tentative Decision, and Order on Reconsideration.
8 FCC Red 557 (1993).
381 Rule making to Amend Part 1,2,21 and 25 of the Commission's Rules to Redesignate 27.5-29.5 GHz
Frequency Band, to Reallocate the 29.5-30.0 GHz Frequency Band, to establish rules and policies for Local
Multipoint Distribution services and for Fixed Satellite Services, First Report and Order and Fourth Notice
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In the Second Report and Order, the Commission decided to allocate the
band 31.0-31.3 MHz spectrum band for exclusive LMDS licenses. This means
that the licensees are protected from harmful interference in the segment
31.225-31.300 GHz. The total spectrum allocated for LMDS will be divided by
493 Basic Trading Areas. Each of the 492 basic trading area is allocated 1,300
MHz, and will have two licenses, one of 150 MHz, the other of 1 150 MHz. The
order provides that licensees may provide a variety of telecommunication and
video distribution services, and can operate on either a Common carrier or
non-common-carrier basis, or both. The Commission decided to use the
competitive bidding procedure to choose among applicants. Finally, the order
prohibits Incumbent LECs and Cable operators from obtaining in-region 1,150
MHz licenses for a period of three years after the Order.
Ill) SPECIALIZED MOBILE RADIO.
Historically, the FCC allocated a series of frequencies near the cellular band
to SMR operators that provide, with a technology similar to the original mobile
service (large tower broadcasting), dispatch to taxi, fleet of trucks and point-to-
point services. In 1991, Nextel Communication received FCC permission to
built another cellular system by dividing the dispatch frequencies in cells. Then
NEXTEL acquired as much dispatch licenses as possible. The objective was to
have a national coverage and offer multiple services such as paging, dispatch
and cellular. It used the TMDA technology, a digital communication system
that will compensate the relative lack of spectrum compare to the cellular
operators. Nextel associated with Motorola ((manufacture of the hand set and
stations) and ComCast (large cable company).
and Propose Rulemaking, FCC 96-31 1, released July 22, 1996.
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The FCC defines SMR as:
"a radio system in which the licensee provides land mobile
communication services in the 800 and 900 MHz band on a
commercial basis to entities eligible to be licensed under the FCC
rules, Federal Government entities, and individuals."380
Although the development of SMR technology has been delayed by technical
difficulties, major industry players such as Nextel (2/3 rd of the territory) and
One Comm have accumulated licenses throughout the country to compete with
cellular operators. Furthermore, the technology benefits from a high
bandwidth and of a low cost of business by subscriber. Forecasts show from 1
to 3 million users in 200 and 12 million in 2006.
IV) GENERAL WIRELESS COMMUNICATION SERVICES.
In the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, 381 Congress required the
Secretary of Commerce to identify 200 MHz that would be transferred by
Federal agencies to private operators. In February 1994, the Department of
Commerce identified three frequency bands available for immediate re-
allocation. On August 2, 1995, the FCC issued the Second Report and Order to
create the General Wireless Communication Services (hereafter "GWCS") and
allocated the 4669-4685 MHz band of spectrum for the licenses to operate it. 382
GWCS licensees will be able to use the spectrum for many different
applications, such as point-to-point microwave services, wireless local loop,
terrestrial fixed and mobile ancillary broadcast operations. 383
382 47 C.F.R. Section 90.7
383 See Reconciliation Act, § 6001 (a)(3), as codified at 47 U.S.C. § 923.
384
Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Governmental Use, ET Docket No. 94-32, FCC
95-47, Released Feb 17, 1995, (Second Report and Order)
385 See Id.
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PART TWO: A NEW REGULATORY MODEL FOR WIRELESS
COMMUNICATION: THE UNLICENSED NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE,
As we have seen in Part I, the prevailing method of spectrum allocation is
based on licenses granted by the FCC through auction, that give exclusive
rights to access the spectrum to the recipient. However, two authors make the
remark that: "[t]ere are many wireless applications that cannot be supported
efficiently under a system based on permanent exclusive access to
spectrum."384 Those applications would be better served, according to them,
with real time access to spectrum even if the spectrum was shared. One of the
application they mention is wireless electronic mail, that needs only sporadic
access to spectrum and can tolerate transmission delays. They explain that
granting exclusive licenses for such wireless applications would be "grossly
inefficient."385 Consequently, there is a need for shared spectrum allowing real
time access. However, the authors remark that sharing the spectrum would
pose the problem of interference. Until now, the government solved the
coordination problems by prohibiting most people in society from using radio
transmitters, in order for some others to communicate successfully. 386
However, technology allows reliance on standards and protocols that enable
multilateral coordination of transmission among equipment owners, without a
person or entity choosing for all other users. 387
384 Durga P. Satapathy and Jon M. Peha, Spectrum Sharing Without Licenses: Opportunities and Danger, in
Interconnection and the Internet, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997. P50.
385 Id
388 See Gen. Y. Benkler, supra note 348.
389
Id.
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Y. Benkler argues that recent technological developments in wireless
communication allow the sharing broad swaths of frequencies among many
users. 388 The interference problem would be solved by a set of rule determining
when, where, and how to transmit. The way the Internet works and the
regulation now applied to the networked computers is an example of this
model. The Internet is based on the common acceptance of a public domain
standard, TCP/IP, industry and professional standard setting procedures, and
reliance on those standards by the competitors in the terminal equipment and
service market. 389
On January 9, 1997, the Commission adopted a final order providing for an
Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure band ("U-NII"). 390 The Order
that became effective on April 1, 1997 reserved 300 MHz of frequencies
(between) for unlicensed operations. 39 'The Order allows devices meeting certain
specification to operate without a license in a 300 MHz range located in the
5.15- 5.35 and 5.75- 5.85 GHz bands. Unlike the licensed operators, these
devices will not be protected legally from interference. Devices will share the
spectrum with licensed devices and will be required not to interfere with them.
The Commission gave no right to the users of these devices, it simply removed
the FCC prohibition of transmitting without the agency's license or the
licensee's authorization. 392 The order opens a legal space for multilateral
coordination of communication where private players will have to develop a
mechanism to avoid interference.
388 See Y. Benkler, supra note 348, at 332.
389
Id.
92 Amendment of the Commission's Rules to provide for Operation of Unlicensed Nil Devices in the 5
Ghz Range, 12 F.C.C.R. 1576 (1997) (Report and Order).
93 Amendment of the Commission's Rules to provide for Operation of Unlicensed Nil Devices in the 5
Ghz Range, 12 F.C.C.R. 1576 (1997) (Report and Order).
394 See Y. Benkler, supra note 348, at 332.
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For the first time the Commission solved the problem of interference
without excluding everybody but one player.
I) REGULATION OF COMMUNICATION IN THE U-II ORDER.
A) General Rules for Equipment.
The prevention of interference is achieved by the imposition of generic
requirements on equipment seeking to transmit without licenses in the
specified frequency band. 393 U-NII devices are designed to provide wide-band,
high data rate, digital, mobile and fixed telecommunication. They require that
transmissions must not exceed specified power levels, 394 that spurious
emission outside the band be attenuated by a specified factor bellow the
maximum power allocated within the band transmission, 395 and that each
device transmit only when it has information to transmit. 396
B) Peak Power and Power Spectral Density.
The most important constraint in the Order is the limitation of power at
which communication devices may transmit. The limits were imposed to avoid
interference with incumbent licensees of narrow bands within the broadband
allocated to U-NII operation. The first limit is the peak power or the maximum
power the transmitter may use for the duration of the transmission burst. The
second limit, the Power Spectral density, was established to have operators use
no more power than necessary.
395 See Wat 332.
396 See Wat 1622.
397 See Wat 1623.
398 See Wat 16243-4.
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The threshold is calculated by dividing the maximum power used by the
breadth of the frequency band over which the transmission is sent at that
power. 397
C) Compartmentalization of the Band Reserved for U-NII.
The Commission divided the 300 MHz band into three sub-bands of 100
MHz, each of them with different maximum peaks and power spectral density,
depending on the nature of the communication used by the licensee operating
in the same frequency. 398 One band is shared with mobile satellite service
feeders links that are very interference sensitive. Consequently, U-NII devices
operating in this band may not operate outside building and must have a built-
in antenna. 399 Another band will allow more powerful devices capable of
providing all types of services, such as indoor LAN, short range multi-building
wireless LANs, longer range communication networks for organizational Wide
Area Networks (WANs), community networks, local loop and mobile
communication. To fully profit from the 300 MHz band, manufacturers will
have to develop three types of equipment; indoors, short range out-door, long
range out-door.
II) WHY THE TWO SYSTEMS ARE SELF-EXCLUSIONARY?
Most of the constrains placed by the order on the operation of U-NII devices
are not to optimize the system but instead are designed to prevent these
devices form interfering with incumbent licensed operators. On the other hand
the coexistence of both regulatory schemes will render the licensed operators
less competitive because of the license costs they have to recoup. 400
399 See Id at 1621-2.
400 See Id at 1622.
40
' See Id at 332.
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